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Smart home devices control a home’s environmental and security settings. This includes
devices that control home thermostats, sprinkler systems, light bulbs, and home
appliances. Malicious manipulation of the settings of these devices by an outside
adversary has caused emotional distress and could even cause physical harm. For
example, researchers have reported that there is a rise in domestic abuse perpetrated via
smart home devices; victims have reported their thermostat settings being unwittingly
manipulated and being locked out of their house due to their smart lock code being
changed. Rapid adoption of smart home devices by consumers has led to an urgent need
to research mitigation strategies to protect consumers from device takeover.
Currently there is not an easy way for home users to detect that a malicious actor is
making unwanted changes to their smart home devices. Change requests to smart home
devices travel across the network in the form of network packets. Most of time the
payloads of the packets are encrypted using strong encryption methods, so it is not
possible to simply read the contents of the packet to learn if the packet contains
instructions for the smart device to change states. Previous research has successfully
trained machine learning algorithms to identify unique network traffic patterns indicative
of state change requests sent to smart home devices. This research extends previous
research by identifying state change requests of smart home devices made by residents
via a smart home device app on their smart phones or tablets. This research identified 13
key attributes of 3,178 encrypted network traffic connections. The attributes were used as
features to train three machine learning algorithms to recognize state change requests.
Four smart home devices were used chosen from the following categories: 1) devices
with simple behaviors (turns on and off), 2) devices with complex behaviors (can be
turned on for a set amount of time), and 3) devices that send a large amount of data (i.e.
video camera).
The success of identifying state change requests over encrypted traffic from a mobile app,
combined with previous research that identified state changes sent to the smart home
device, allows for the development of a system that could block unwanted state changes
that originate from a malicious user located outside of the house. Therefore, this research
contributes to the body of knowledge of smart home device security and could be
extended to the identification of other networking patterns based on encrypted traffic.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Background
Domestic abuse hotlines have been receiving calls from women who have
reported various issues with their smart home devices; one woman reported that she
turned on her air-conditioner and a moment later it turned off all by itself, another said
that the codes to her front door smart lock kept changing, and one reported that her smart
doorbell would periodically ring with no one at the front door (Bowles, 2018). Bowles
(2018) found that the changes were not occurring because of some bug in the software,
but by men who were actively harassing their partners. This type of domestic abuse is on
the rise thanks to the explosive adoption of Internet of Things devices(He et al., 2018).
The term Internet of Things (IoT) first appeared in 1999 and is attributed to the
British technologist Ashton (Ashton, 1999). He described it as physical objects that
connect to the Internet via sensors. The term has grown to include the data that is
exchanged between devices, stored in the cloud, and analyzed (Weber, 2016). Smart
home devices are a subset of IoT, referring to IoT devices used in a residence. This paper
uses the term smart home devices instead of IoT since this research is focused on devices
found in a home. Examples of smart home devices include: smart light bulbs that can turn
on when we enter the room, smart refrigerators that remind us that we are almost out of
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milk, smart doorbells that call our smart phone and allows us to talk to the person at the
front door, to the more bizarre example of a soil sensors for house plants that tweets
“water me please” when they are too dry (Hammill & Hendricks, 2013).
Two of the top vulnerabilities of smart home devices, weak password policies and
a lack of account lockout by the device’s Cloud server, make account takeover trivial for
attackers (Alharbi & Aspinall, 2018). Once an attacker has commandeered a smart
device, the type of damage inflicted is only limited by the attacker’s imagination and the
functionality of the smart home device. Theoretical attacks include: locking a resident’s
television until a ransom has been paid, targeting specific individuals for harassment, and
even scaring someone out of their house so that the attacker can gain access for robbery
or other purposes (Freed et al., 2018a; Ronen & Shamir, 2016a).
Problem Statement
One of the most risk-inducing features of smart home devices is that they can be
accessed from anywhere in the world (Ali et al., 2017; Jia et al., 2017; Ronen & Shamir,
2016a). As a result, a malicious user can manipulate the devices with known user
credentials (Freed et al., 2018a). More advanced attacks, such as a malicious actor
gaining control of a Cloud server, is also possible (Alharbi & Aspinall, 2018).
Smart home devices, such as WiFi connected light bulbs and thermostats, are
becoming more prevalent in residential homes (He et al., 2018). Currently there is not an
easy way for home users to detect that a malicious actor is making unwanted changes to
their smart home devices (Geeng & Roesner, 2019a; Matthews et al., 2017; Zeng et al.,
2017). Change requests to smart home devices travel across the network in the form of
network packets. Most of time the payloads of the packets are encrypted by using strong
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encryption methods, so it is not possible to simply read the contents of the packet to learn
if the packet contains instructions for the smart device to change states (Apthorpe,
Reisman, Sundaresan, et al., 2017; Copos et al., 2016a). Despite the payload being
encrypted, there are attributes of the packet that are not, such as the source Internet
Protocol (IP) and Media Access Control (MAC) address, the destination address, any
Domain Name System (DNS) queries, the protocol, and several other revealing pieces of
the packet are unencrypted (Apthorpe, Reisman, & Feamster, 2017b; Vijay Sivaraman et
al., 2015). These attributes, along with the size of the payload can be used to establish
patterns indicative of a smart device state change request, versus an update, versus a
status check (Meidan et al., 2017).
Researchers have successfully identified smart home devices and the state
changes applied to the devices by implementing machine learning algorithms to
categorize encrypted network traffic (Acar et al., 2018; Apthorpe, Reisman, Sundaresan,
et al., 2017; Copos et al., 2016b; Marchal et al., 2019; Meidan et al., 2017; Miettinen et
al., 2017a). Copos et al. (2016) and Acar et al. (2018) identified unique network traffic
patterns indicative of state change requests with the assistance of two supervised learning
algorithms, Random Forest (RF) and k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN). It was observed that
when the Nest Thermostat transitions from Home to Away packets are sent from the Nest
to a specific Nest Cloud server with payload sizes of 1375, 1391, and 2911 (Copos et al.,
2016b).
Other researchers found that the Wemo Insight Switch receives large spikes of
data when switched from off to on and vice versa (Acar et al., 2018). Several researchers
were able to identify the specific smart home device, for example a smart smoke alarm
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was connected to the network, through network traffic patterns (Marchal et al., 2019;
Meidan et al., 2017; Miettinen et al., 2017a). Other researchers studied the flow of traffic,
which they defined as the sequence of packets sent by a device over a particular protocol,
such as Network Time Protocol (NTP), Address Resolution Protocol (ARP),
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), and others (Marchal et al., 2019). The researchers
converted the flow into a binary time series which was segmented into one second
intervals with each segment containing a one if there was at least one packet during that
time and zero if there was not. They discovered that each device’s flow of network traffic
produced a distinct pattern. This research built upon the aforementioned research to
identify state change requests across a variety of different types of popular smart home
devices.
Dissertation Goal
This research extended previous research by identifying the best performing
features and machine learning algorithm combination capable of identifying state change
requests across a variety of different types of popular smart home devices. It was
important to focus on popular smart home devices so that the outcome of this research
was be applicable to the widest audience possible. The different types included smart
home devices that have simple behavior (i.e. turn a switch on and off), complex behavior
(i.e. turn water on for five minutes), and send large amounts of data (i.e. video cameras).
Similar methods, implemented by previous researchers, leveraging machine learning
algorithms were used to categorize encrypted network traffic patterns originating from
the user’s WiFi connected smart phone or tablet, indicative of state change requests of
smart home devices.
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Identifying state change requests across a variety of different types of smart home
devices, must be done at the home network level, which is the common connection point
for most smart home device communication (Zeichick, 2018). To accomplish this, home
network traffic flow was sequenced into packet size over time intervals (Acar et al.,
2018). To link user action to traffic patterns several features of the traffic flow was
studied to identify patterns. Interesting features to study included the average packet size
per sequence, standard deviation of packet sizes, average time series, protocols used in
communication, and many other identifiable packet attributes.
To accurately train a machine learning algorithm it is important to identify the
most meaningful features. Testing features for worthiness was accomplished by
implementing a 4-fold cross validation was performed, which involved randomly
splitting the training set into five distinct subsets, training and evaluating the model 4
times, picking a different fold for evaluation each time, and then training on the other 4
folds. The potential set of features to be studied can be represented as follows.
𝐸" = {𝐹, 𝐷, 𝐿}
E, represents the extracted features and T represents the time interval. F are the features
of the traffic sent to the smart home device to initiate a state change, which were
mentioned earlier in the paper (e.g. the source IP and MAC address, the destination
address, any DNS queries, and the protocol). D is the set of smartphones and tablets, and
L is used to denote location of where a change request originated. L is a binary value
representing whether the smartphone or tablet is connected to the home network, which
means that it is home, or not connected to the home network, which identifies it as not
home. T can be represented as follows: 𝑇 = +𝑡! , 𝑡$ , … , 𝑡% ..
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In the above definition, 𝐹 = {𝑓! , 𝑓$ , … , 𝑓& } in which 𝑓' (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛) represents a
feature. The set F was e based on those commonly adopted by literature. One goal of this
research was to identify a subset of F that can be used to identify state changes
effectively and efficiently.
Based on the success of previous research in identifying state changes sent to the
smart home device, this research tested the effectiveness of both the Random Forest
classifier and KNN classifier to identify patterns of network originating from a smart
phone and tablet. Additionally, the effectiveness of Naïve Bayes algorithms was also
assessed.
The ability to detect a state change across multiple types of smart home devices is
the missing piece to identify if a malicious actor is actively manipulating a resident’s
smart home device or devices. It was the intention that this research will assist in
identifying where the state change request originated from; did the user request the
change from inside their house, using their home WiFi connected smart phone or tablet,
or did the change request originate from outside the home, from an individual
communicating directly to the smart device’s Cloud site? The key to differentiating
between internal and external state change requests is to correlate the outbound request
made by the user on their home WiFi connected smart phone/tablet to the inbound state
change request from the smart device’s Cloud site. If an outbound request exists and then
a corresponding inbound request exists, then the change was made from inside the house.
If there is only the inbound request, then the change request originated from outside of
the house. This will address situations when a malicious actor has surreptitiously gained
access to the smart device’s Cloud site via compromised credentials giving them control
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over the resident’s smart home device. The specific scenario that was studied is when the
user is at home and changes are being initiated on the Cloud site from outside the user’s
home by a malicious actor.
Other scenarios are also applicable. This research could help identify when a
botnet has taken control of a smart home device and is actively controlling it.
Additionally, it could identify when a manufacturer’s Cloud server has been
compromised and the attackers are actively controlling the smart home device.
Ideally, the smart device manufacturer would provide a solution to prevent rogue
changes to smart home devices. One solution would be for manufacturers to alert users
when they notice logins from unknown devices or devices located in previously unseen
locations. Unfortunately, this feature does not appear to be provided by any manufacturer
(He et al., 2018). Another approach to prevent unwanted changes from outside the home
would be to prevent smart home devices from connecting to the Internet. This is not
viable since researchers have determined that blocking smart home devices from
connecting to the Internet causes many of the devices to stop working (Apthorpe,
Reisman, Sundaresan, et al., 2017)
In summary, to identify change requests to smart home devices by smartphones or
tablets, identifying features of network traffic were extracted and used to train several
machine learning algorithms. The features extracted were tested to ensure that they did
not mislead the machine learning algorithm. Next, several machine learning algorithms
were trained and tested to identify which was suited to identify the state change requests.
Research Questions
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The research questions focused on each aspect of the project, from choosing the
correct smart home devices to include in the study, to identify smart home device
changes that have been sent over an encrypted connection.
•

What popular smart home devices receive their instructions from their Cloud
server?

•

What popular smart home devices connect to a home WiFi network?

•

What popular smart home devices send unencrypted network traffic?

•

What popular smart home devices send encrypted network traffic?

•

Will publicly available network traffic captures of smart home devices be useful?
o Will they contain traffic of change requests sent from a smart phone/tablet
to a smart home device?
§

•

Will the traffic be identifiable since it is encrypted?

Is it possible to learn the general goal of encrypted traffic sent by smart phone
apps, by correlating the traffic to events on the smart home device?
o Is it possible to differentiate commands from background traffic?
§

Updates to the device, time updates, other communication of this
type?

•

Which type of feature will be most useful in training a machine learning
algorithm to recognize state change requests in encrypted payloads?
o statistical features
o aggregated features
o synthesized
o protocol specific
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•

Which machine learning algorithm will perform the most efficiently to identify
patterns of encrypted network traffic indicative of state change requests of smart
home devices?
o RF
o KNN
o Naïve Bayes

Relevance and Significance
Initial research into the typical network architecture of smart home devices
revealed some unique characteristics that may be used to alert a user that a malicious
actor has made an unwanted change to their smart home device. The main concept is that
most smart home devices are directly controlled by a manufacturer’s Cloud server
(Apthorpe, Reisman, & Feamster, 2017a). When a user is at home and makes a change on
their smartphone via the smart device’s app, the change request traverses their home
WiFi network, is sent to the smart device’s Cloud server, the change is noted on the
Cloud server, sent to the home WiFi network, then, finally, applied to the smart home
device (see Figure 1). This means that at the home network level, when a user is at home,
changes originate from inside the home, travel outside the home, then back in again.
This is in contrast to when someone outside the home makes a change; the change
is applied to the Cloud server, sent down to the home WiFi network, and applied to the
smart device (see Figure 2). What is missing in this scenario, is the change request
originating from inside the home. This missing piece can be used to establish if the
change originated from inside the home or from outside the home. This can be used if the
user is at home and wants to be alerted if someone outside the home has made a change.
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Figure 1. Change initiated by a home user (notice both the change request by the smart
phone and the change pulled from the Cloud server traverse the home wireless router)

Figure 2. Change initiated by a rogue actor (notice that the change request made by the
rogue actor does not traverse the home wireless
The purpose of this research was to identify “rogue changes”, which is defined
here as changes made to a smart home device by an actor who is outside the home
network. This addresses the situation of when a user is at home and wants to be alerted
when unwanted changes are being made by an individual outside the home.
Unfortunately, this situation is becoming more common in domestic abuse situations
(Naughton, 2018). Naughton (2018) found that men are the ones that typically install a
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smart home device, so they are the ones that also control the device. Naughton (2018)
found men are using smart home devices to harass their partners. There are times when a
home user will want to make changes to their smart home devices when they are away
from their home, and, therefore, not on their home network. This research did not intend
to create the full software solution to identify rogue changes. Instead, this research
intended to fill a gap that would allow for the creation of such software. Previous
research has been successful at using machine learning to identify state changes in
network traffic for specific smart home devices, however, there doesn’t appear to be
research that has identified a solution across disparate device types. This research enables
the identification of state change requests across several different device types. This
provides the missing link to create a tool that is able to identify if a state change request
originated from in the house or outside the house.
Another common scenario this addresses is compromised Cloud accounts. It has
been shown that two of the top vulnerabilities of smart home devices are weak password
policies and no account lockout by the smart device’s Cloud server interface (Alharbi &
Aspinall, 2018). This vulnerability introduces the risk of attacks being carried out against
a compromised account. A Milwaukee couple’s smart home devices were accessed by an
attacker due to a compromised username and password (Sears, 2019). The attacker turned
their thermostat up to 90 degrees, then started talking to them via their Nest Security
camera, and finally started playing vulgar music over the security camera.
This research did not intend to address all aspects of smart home device security.
Like computer security, it is a broad field covering topics such as data extraction, device
manipulation, forming a botnet of smart home devices, and many others (Kolias et al.,
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2017; Sikder et al., 2018). This research, which was focused on unwanted changes to
smart device settings originating from outside of the house, is an area that does not
appear to be covered.
One of the biggest challenges of this research was that most network traffic
between a smart phone to the Cloud server and from the Cloud server to the smart device
is encrypted (Copos et al., 2016b). Therefore, it was difficult to match the network traffic
to the change being made. The action must be learned by correlating the action to type of
network traffic. This is a black box problem (the actual work done to solve the problem is
not known) which will rely on pattern recognition to solve. Acar et al. (2018) found a
small discrepancy in traffic size when the Wemo Insight Switch was turned from on to
off and from off to on. Other researchers analyzing network traffic have been able to
positively identify the motion sensor of a Nest device being tripped and the wake word
being spoken for Amazon’s Echo (Apthorpe, Reisman, Sundaresan, et al., 2017).
Barriers and Issues
One of the main challenges for this research was to learn the purpose of encrypted
network traffic based upon patterns identified through training a machine learning
algorithm. Previous research has demonstrated that it is possible to determine, through
network traffic patterns, when a smart light switch is turned on and off (Apthorpe,
Reisman, & Feamster, 2017b). The same methodology implemented by Apthorpe et al.
(2017b) was followed during this research.
Both datasets, one provided by Alrawi et al. (2019) and the other by Ren et al.
(2019), are raw network traffic captures. Neither of the research groups provided labeling
of the data. Therefore, another challenge faced by this research was interpreting the
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encrypted payloads and then labeling the datasets. As mentioned, since the payloads are
encrypted it was impossible to see if they contain state change requests. Therefore, state
change requests were generated with the same smart home device in our lab environment
and then were compared with the traffic from the publicly available network traffic.
When the encrypted traffic that matched (e.g. payload size, response time, protocol, etc.)
then the publicly available network traffic packet was labeled as a state change.
Assumptions, Limitations and Delimitations
The main goal was to identify state change requests sent over a network from an
app on a smart phone to the smart home device’s Cloud site. Therefore, this research only
focused on traffic sent from a smart phone or tablet to a smart device’s Cloud site.
Identifying these state changes filled the missing piece to create an application that could
identify smart home device state change requests that originate from outside of the home.
However, creating this application was outside the scope of this research.
This research includes smart home devices that have been designed to have
change requests first flow through the device’s Cloud site then to the smart home device.
It is assumed that having change requests first go to the device’s Cloud site and then to
the device itself is a very common architecture. Therefore, this research is applicable to
the most common smart home devices in use.
This research did not plan to address the other numerous security vulnerabilities
of smart home devices; current security vulnerabilities include issues such as snooping on
personal webcams, analyzing web traffic generated by smart home devices to determine
if the homeowner is home or away, and maliciously gaining access to a smart home
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device via a known vulnerability. These other issues have been well documented and
there are several research efforts currently underway.
Definition of Terms
•

Smart home device
o An electronic device that connects to the Internet, can be controlled
remotely by the user, and was purchased for use in the home.

•

Malicious actor
o A group or individual that wishes to cause harm, either physical or
emotional, to its target group or individual.

•

Cloud service
o A server controlled and housed by the manufacturer of the smart home
device

•

Botnet
o A collection of computers, which can include smart home devices, that
have been commandeered by an attacker to cause harm to their target.
The harm typically involves having all of the computers in the botnet
send network traffic to one site in attempt to overwhelm the target
preventing it from responding to legitimate traffic.

•

Black box problem
o A problem is presented and the answer is given without any explanation of
how the answer was arrived at. The actual work done to solve the problem
is not known. This is typical of machine learning algorithms that are
trained with massive amounts of data, but not instructed on how to exactly
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solve the given problem. The algorithm is fed the question and responds
with an answer void of explanation of how the answer was reached.
List of Acronyms
•

ACK
o acknowledgement

•

ANN
o Artificial Neural Network

•

ARP
o Address Resolution Protocol

•

CARA
o Clairvoyant access right assignment

•

CSV
o Comma separated value

•

DDOS
o Distributed denial of service

•

DOS
o Denial of service

•

DNS
o Domain Name Service

•

ESO
o environmental situation oracles

•

GPS
o Global positioning service
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•

IAT
o Inter-arrival time

•

IDM
o Intrusion Detection Mitigation

•

IDS
o Intrusion Detection System

•

IoT
o Internet of Things

•

IP
o Internet Protocol

•

ISP
o Internet Service Provider

•

KNN
o k-Nearest Neighbors

•

LED
o Light-emitting diode

•

MAC (address)
o Media access control (address)

•

NIDS
o Network-based Intrusion Detection System

•

NTP
o Network Time Protocol

•

RF
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o Random Forest
•

SDN
o software defined networking

•

SVM
o Support Vector Machine

•

SSL
o Secure Sockets Layer

•

SYN
o synchronize

•

TCP
o Transmission Control Protocol

•

TPR
o true positive rate

•

WiFi
o Wireless networking technology

Summary
This research extended previous research by identifying the best performing
features and machine learning algorithm combination capable of identifying state change
requests across a variety of different types of popular smart home devices. This was
accomplished by training a machine learning algorithm with home network traffic in
order for it to learn the network pattern analogous of smart home device change requests
from smart phones and tablets. Several categories of smart home devices were included
in the study along with their corresponding smart phone apps.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature

Introduction to Smart Home Device Security
Companies are rushing to meet consumers’ growing need for smart home devices.
This rush to market by manufacturers has produced serious deficiencies in privacy and
security. This same mistake was made 20 years ago when consumers rushed to the
Internet to shop and bank online (Shackelford et al., 2017). The Internet was designed to
openly share data, which is the complete opposite of what is necessary for secure
transactions. Malicious actors took advantage of the lack of security by creating malware
and sniffing unencrypted data with the goal of stealing personal data (Shackelford et al.,
2017). The industry responded by adding security layers and products. Secure Sockets
Layer (SSL) was implemented to secure internet transactions, antivirus programs to rid
computers of nasty malware, and passwords to authenticate users. This solution is not
foolproof since it relies on consumers to implement many of the solutions. Unfortunately,
most home users are not technical; they do not understand how to properly configure
their systems or realize the importance of a strong password (Fu et al., 2017b). The same
is true with smart home devices. Most home users can’t perform basic security functions
which leads to the question: should they be adding smart devices to their homes (Walker,
2014)?
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Current Research of Smart Home Device Security
Research has uncovered major vulnerabilities in smart home devices. Alrawi et al.
(2019) evaluated the security of 45 smart home devices by studying the security of the
smart devices’ services, its mobile applications, its Cloud endpoints, and its
communications. They found that several of the devices’ services had self-signed
certificates, supported weak ciphers, used short Transmission Layer Security (TLS)/
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) keys, permitted the use of vulnerable version of SSL, and
had expired certificates (Alrawi et al., 2019a). For the mobile apps the researchers found
that one or more issues related to permissions, sensitive data, or incorrect use of
cryptography. They also found 24 over-privileged mobile applications that had
permissions on the mobile device that were not used. On the smart devices’ network, they
found 18 devices that used outdated services, leaked sensitive information, lacked
encryption for authentication, or ran a vulnerable service. They found that: 1) eight
devices used cloud endpoints that are vulnerable and have public exploits, 2) seven
devices authenticated with cloud endpoints in clear text, and 3) 26 devices used cloud
endpoints that have TLS/SSL configuration issues, like self-signed certificates, domain
name mismatch, and support for vulnerable versions of TLS/SSL protocol. One positive
finding is that the majority of the devices used encryption when communicating over the
Internet
Notra et al. (2014) experimented with several smart home devices, including the
Phillips Hue light-bulb, the Belkin WeMo power switch, and the Nest smoke-alarm, and
found that the devices lack encryption, appropriate authentication, and integrity checks.
These vulnerabilities make IoT devices susceptible to a variety of attacks including:
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denial of service (DOS), replay, man-in-the-middle, device tampering, information
disclosure, side channel attack, and eavesdropping (Atamli & Martin, 2014; Kasinathan
et al., 2013).
A French company, Eurecom, analyzed 123 smart devices and discovered 38
vulnerabilities that included bad encryption and deliberately set backdoors (Costin et al.,
2014a). Out of the fifty smart home devices that Symantec studied none of them forced
strong passwords or implemented authentication between the device and the cloud
(Wueest, 2015). Hewlett Packard had similar findings and characterized the main smart
home device security issues as: not encrypting network traffic, poor authentication, and
vulnerable web interfaces (Enterprise, 2015). This problem is so bad that the FBI warned
home users of smart home devices’ vulnerabilities (FBI, 2015).
Attacks to smart home devices are external, the Mirai botnet, and internal,
harassing residents by altering the thermostat (He et al., 2019a). These attacks can be
categorized into five types of behavior: 1) ignoring the functionality, 2) reducing the
functionality, 3) extending the functionality, 4) discerning residents’ behavior based on
smart device generated network activity, and 5) misusing the functionality (Apthorpe,
Reisman, & Feamster, 2017b; Ronen & Shamir, 2016a). In the first type, the attacker
ignores the designed feature of the smart home device (if it was a smart camera, they
don’t use any of the functionality of a camera) and instead treat the device as an
embedded computer (Ronen & Shamir, 2016a). An example of this is installing malware
on the smart home device to make it part of a botnet. Botnets comprised of smart home
devices have been used to perform large scale distributed denial of service (DDOS)
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attacks; an example is the Mirai attack which brought down major services such as
Twitter, Netflix, Reddit, and GitHub (Kolias et al., 2017)
The second type of attack is reducing the functionality of the smart home device
which involves disabling the device or features of the device. Examples include disabling
a smart television so that it won’t turn on and altering the functionality of a smart
refrigerator so that it won’t cool its contents (Ronen & Shamir, 2016a).
The third type of attack, extending the functionality, involves using the
functionality in a different way than designed in order to achieve an unexpected or
different physical effect. Ronen et al. (2016) demonstrated an attack in which they took
control of a smart light bulb and strobed the lights in such a way as to trigger seizures in
people suffering from photosensitive epilepsy. The same researchers also demonstrated
how they could manipulate an light-emitting diode’s (LED) light intensity to create a
covert channel (Ronen & Shamir, 2016a). This was accomplished by quickly switching
light intensities that mimic the sending of binary data. The light intensities used were so
close in brightness that they could not be discerned by the human eye.
The fourth type of attack involves discerning residents’ behavior based upon the
network traffic generated by smart home devices (Apthorpe, Reisman, & Feamster,
2017b). Researchers studied the Sense Sleep Monitor, the Nest Cam Indoor security
camera, the WeMo switch, and the Amazon Echo and found that the encrypted network
traffic generated by these devices reveal sensitive information about the users (Apthorpe,
Reisman, & Feamster, 2017b). For the Sense sleep monitor the network traffic peaked
when the user interacted with it; in the smart home laboratory the researchers were able
to deduce that the user went to bed at 12:30, briefly got up at 6:30am and then got up at
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9:15am. These times correlated to spikes in network traffic generated by the Sense sleep
monitor revealing the user’s sleep pattern. The same correlations were made between
device usage and traffic spikes for the Nest Cam Indoor security camera, the Wemo
switch and the Amazon Echo (Apthorpe, Reisman, & Feamster, 2017b). Copos et al.
(2016) was able to identify the network traffic patterns produced when the Nest smoke
detector detects smoke and when the smoke alarm is triggered.
The fifth type of attack, misusing the functionality, is the main focus of this
research project. This attack uses the functionality of the smart home device, but does so
in an incorrect or unauthorized way (Ronen & Shamir, 2016a). These attacks are
typically used to harass the resident. For example, an attacker my turn down the smart
thermostat in the winter so that house if very cold or turn the lights on in the middle of
the night to wake victim.
Domestic Abusers Use of Smart Home Devices
Smart home devices are becoming the weapon of choice for perpetrators of
domestic abuse (Freed et al., 2018a). This is not surprising given their history of using
technology against their victims. Examples of this abuse includes online harassment,
cyberbullying, cyberstalking, and doxing (Douglas, 2016; Fraser et al., 2010; Vitak et al.,
2017a; Wisniewski et al., 2016a). Domestic abuse is surprisingly common, with research
indicating that one in three women and one in six men will experience intimate partner
violence in their life (Freed et al., 2018a).
Examples of smart device domestic abuse include: switching the air-conditioner
off right after the victim turns it on, changing the code for the smart front door lock, and
triggering the doorbell to ring (Bowles, 2018). Abusers do this to either watch and listen,
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or, more likely in domestic abuse cases, to show power (Bowles, 2018). These attacks are
accomplished in the very low-tech method of signing into the device’s Cloud account
with the username and password. In some cases the abuser already knows the username
and password because they were the one that setup the smart home device (Freed et al.,
2018a). In other cases, they gain the password either by intimidating the victim to
disclose it, guessing the password based upon intimate knowledge of the victim, or by
answering the password reset security questions (Freed et al., 2018a).
Even though domestic abusers’ attack methods are not technically sophisticated
does not mean that they are easy to prevent. Freed et al (2018) analyzed current threat
models and countermeasures and determined that they do not adequately address attacks
in which the attacker possesses intimate knowledge of their victims. To solve this
problem the researchers suggest focusing on attack methods of average computer users,
like carrying out an attack with a compromised password. Freed et al. (2018)
recommended analyzing the difference in legitimate user behavior versus the attacker’s.
They suggest the Cloud service use the learned difference in behavior during
authentication to determine if it is the legitimate user logging in or the attacker.
Smart Home Device Architecture
The network architecture of smart home devices is typically configured in one of
two ways: 1) Cloud-centric, which is mobile application to cloud or 2) direct access,
which is mobile application to device (Wang et al., 2018). With Cloud-centric, the user
issues changes via their smart phone which communicates directly with the smart home
device’s Cloud server, which relays the changes to the smart home device (Notra et al.,
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2014). An example of a smart home device that uses this architecture is the Nest
thermostat.
Direct access cuts out the Cloud server as the middle-man. Instead the user
communicates directly to the smart home device via the app on their smart phone (Notra
et al., 2014). Examples include the Philips Hue light-bulb and the WeMo switch.
The Cloud-centric architecture is currently the most popular (Intellectsoft, 2015).
The focus of this research is primarily on the Cloud-centric architecture since it is
focused on malicious state changes to smart home devices originating from outside of the
home.
Blocking the Smart Home Device from Accessing the Cloud
On initial examination of how to block external attackers from making changes to
smart devices located in the home it may seem like the best approach would be to block
the smart home device from connecting to its Cloud site. After all, if the smart home
device cannot connect to its Cloud site it will not get any of the changes requested by an
external attacker. However, as outlined in the previous section, Cloud-centric is the most
common configuration for smart home devices. Hence, if Cloud access is blocked, then
the user who is at home will not be able to make any changes to their smart home device
because all of their requests go through the smart device’s Cloud site.
Additionally, completely blocking a smart home device from connecting to its
Cloud server renders most smart home devices ineffective. Apthorpe et al. (2017) tested
removing internet access to seven smart home devices and found that four of the devices
lost most of their smart features while the remaining three devices completely lost
functionality. It is worth noting that researchers found that they were able to block select
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network traffic of some smart devices without losing any functionality (Copos et al.,
2016b; Notra et al., 2014; Vijay Sivaraman et al., 2015). Sivaraman et al. (2014) and
Notra et al. (2014) both were able to block the Nest’s Smoke Alarm from sending logs to
its Cloud logging server while still allowing a home user to be alerted when the smoke
alarm detected smoke. Copos et al. (2016) blocked the Nest Smoke Alarm’s access to all
Cloud servers except for the Cloud servers responsible for authentication, notification,
and token renewal. They set off the smoke alarm and successfully received a fire
notification.
Access Control
An Access Control List (ACL) could be used to block unwanted changes to smart
home devices. An ACL is used to specify if a subject or an object is approved or denied
for a specific action (Schuster et al., 2018a). Traditional ACLs have been used for smart
home devices; the problem is they are not specific enough to be effective with smart
home devices. Decisions need to be made based upon the situation in which a change is
being requested, the context of the change, or even the state of the environment (He et al.,
2018; Jia et al., 2017; Tian et al., 2017a). Additionally, several different users interact
with smart home devices, such as the family’s Alexa device or their smart lock connected
to their front door (He et al., 2018). This would be fine if all users in the house should
have the same type of access. He et al. (2018) points out that households often have very
complex social relationships; there may be parents who want to spy on their teenagers,
mischievous children, or even abusive partners (Matthews et al., 2017; Ur et al., 2014a).
It is extremely important to take these relationships into consideration when populating
an ACL.
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He et al. (2018) found that it was important to their research participants that
users be physically present in the house whenever they change a smart device’s behavior;
68% of the participants felt that the user must be home to control the lights, unless it was
the owner or the spouse making the change. Other major factors in deciding access
control was the age of the person making the change, the time the change is requested,
the status of the induvial making the change, and the location of the smart device in the
home, all of which are not supported by current smart home devices (He et al., 2018;
Ravidas et al., 2019). Access controls based upon situational conditions in not a new
thing, smartphone frameworks have been using this for many years (Schuster et al.,
2018a). The main difference in ACLs between smartphones and smart home devices is
that smartphones typically have one user and smart home devices have several users.
Determining if the user is at home has been implemented by many smart home
devices including: SmartThings, Nest, Ecobee, Wink, Apple HomeKit, Sennse Mother,
Abode, Netatmo, and Honeywell (Schuster et al., 2018a). The two main ways to
determine if the user is at home is the global positioning system (GPS) coordinates of the
user’s smartphone and motion sensors on the smart home devices (Schuster et al., 2018a).
The upside to the GPS location is that it is possible to uniquely identify the user since the
user’s phone is directly linked to the user. The downside is it that it not only tracks if the
user is at home, but also everywhere they go outside of their home. This creates privacy
concerns, especially if the user’s location is shared with another smart home device that
is simply attempting to determine if the user is home or not (Schuster et al., 2018a). The
problem with the motion sensor is that it can only track if someone is home, not exactly
who is at home.
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Schuster et al. (2018) proposed environmental situation oracles (ESOs) which
gather situational data from multiple smart home devices, such as the user’s GPS location
and if a particular motion sensor was tripped. The ESOs can be queried by an ACL to
determine if a particular situation exists or not. For example, there may be a rule that a
teenager must be home to control the lights. The ACL could query the ESO containing
the teenager’s GPS location. However, the ESO would not divulge the teenager’s GPS
coordinates, instead it would respond true if they are home or false if they are out. The
ESO solution is currently theoretical and has not seen much (if any) industry adoption.
One of the most important features of an ACL is that it must be easy to use by a
homeowner (Ravidas et al., 2019). Usability is particularly important since most home
users have very little knowledge about security (Kim et al., 2011). Mahalle et al. (2013)
developed a system modeled on a trust-based access control model designed to
automatically set rules based on the trustworthiness of the user. Another system called
Clairvoyant access right assignment (CARA), is designed to automatically give
suggestions about the access rights a visitor to the home should have (Kim et al., 2011).
One of the main constraints implemented by CARA is that the visitor must be in the
house to access the device. Restricting the use of a device to only those physically present
in the house is the main goal of this research project. Implementing an ACL is not a
viable solution to the problem presented in this case since the attacker is masquerading as
the home user; the attackers are using the victim’s username and password to gain access.
ACLs are not designed to block access to a system due to a compromised account.
Monitor Network Activity
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Network attacks against smart devices can be passive or active; malicious actors
can passively monitor network traffic to exfiltrate sensitive information or they can attack
the devices, which creates network traffic. Several researchers have trained machine
learning algorithms to passively learn network traffic patterns generated by smart home
devices, to piece together clues from the devices’ actions to infer the residents’ in home
behaviors (Acar et al., 2018; Apthorpe, Reisman, & Feamster, 2017a; Apthorpe,
Reisman, Sundaresan, et al., 2017; Barrera et al., 2017b; Copos et al., 2016b; Junges et
al., 2019; OConnor et al., 2019; Ren et al., 2019a; Subahi & Theodorakopoulos, 2019).
Other researchers have used an Intrusion Detection system to monitor for attacks on
smart home devices (Anthi et al., 2019; Hodo et al., 2016; Mehdi Nobakht et al., 2016;
Ramapatruni et al., 2019; Vijay Sivaraman et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2018). The types of
attacks to monitor for include: 1) Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), 2) conventional
attack, 3) routing attack, and 4) man-in-the-middle (Zarpelão et al., 2017).
Hodo et al. (2016) used a Network-Based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) to
identify and thwart DDoS attacks performed against smart home devices. The NIDS used
an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) which was trained via a supervised learning
procedure. This involved feeding the neural network with a labeled training set in order
for it to learn the difference between normal and anomalous traffic (Hodo et al., 2016).
Anthi et al. (2019) focused on detecting conventional attacks on smart home devices. The
research involved establishing the normal behavior of each smart home device,
identifying when an attack is occurring based on identified malicious packets, and
determining the type of attack that is taking place against which smart home device.
Ramapatruni et al. (2019) followed a similar approach leveraging machine learning
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algorithms, such as Hidden Markov Models, to learn the normal traffic patterns of smart
home devices. Using the normal traffic patterns as a baseline, Ramapatruni et al. (2019)
identified any traffic outside the baseline as anomalous traffic. The researchers were
successful 97% of the time in identifying malicious traffic.
Sivaraman et al. (2015) extended this concept by dynamically quarantining smart
home devices that were producing traffic determined to be malicious. This solution
would be implemented though the use of Software Defined Networking (SDN). SDN
would allow for dynamic security rules, such as if someone is in the house or the time of
day of an event, such as tuning on music at 2 a.m. Instead of implementing this solution
in the house, Sivaraman et al. (2015) propose that a specialist, such as the Internet
Service Provider (ISP), offer this service. The ISP would receive a feed of network
traffic, learn the typical behavior of all of the smart devices and the residents’ interactions
with the devices, tweaking the rules as more data was fed into it (Vijay Sivaraman et al.,
2015).
Routing attacks, the third type of attacks studied by researchers interested in
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for smart home devices, are designed to disrupt
network traffic. One popular routing attack, the worm hole attack, disrupts network
traffic by creating a network tunnel between two devices and then sending all of the
network traffic through the tunnel (Pongle & Chavan, 2015). This attack is typically
found in smart devices outside the home. Pongle et al. (2015) created an IDS specifically
to detect wormhole attacks.
In man-in-the-middle attacks, the attacker is able to intercept their adversary’s
traffic in order to monitor the traffic, modify it, or stop it completely (Tertytchny et al.,
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2019a). Researchers were able to gain access to a LightwaveRF smart home device via a
man-in-the-middle attack in which they intercepted the device’s firmware update,
modified the update so that they could easily access the device, then sent the update to
the device (Barcena & Wueest, 2015). Tertytchny et al. (2019) created an IDS which was
successful in identifying these attacks about 90% of the time. Nobakht et al. (2016)
created a host-based intrusion detection system called IoT- Intrusion Detection Mitigation
(IDM) designed to differentiate between suspicious and normal network activity and
block identified suspicious activity. The researchers tested IoT-IDM with a Hue Smart
Light Bulb system in which they were able to sniff the secret key, known as a whitelist
token, which is used to authenticate a known user. The whitelist token was used by the
simulated attacker, who was connected to the home network, to log into the Hue Smart
Light Bulbs. IoT-IDM, using a learning model that leverages SVMs to classify the data,
was able to identify the attack with an accuracy of 100%.
Passive attacks involve capturing network traffic generated by smart home
devices. Once captured, researchers have demonstrated that patterns identified by
machine learning algorithms can show what the smart home device is doing, even if the
network traffic is encrypted (Junges et al., 2019; Subahi & Theodorakopoulos, 2019). To
train the machine learning algorithms researchers have used a variety of characteristics of
the network traffic including: the throughput, burstiness, direction, size of payload, the
proportion of synchronize (SYN) and acknowledgement (ACK) packets (which are
involved in establishing a TCP connection), plus various statistics calculated about the
network traffic (Acar et al., 2018; Apthorpe, Reisman, & Feamster, 2017a; Apthorpe,
Reisman, Sundaresan, et al., 2017; Barrera et al., 2017b; Copos et al., 2016b; Junges et
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al., 2019; OConnor et al., 2019; Ren et al., 2019a; Subahi & Theodorakopoulos, 2019).
Apthorpe et al. (2017) were able to link device state changes to its network traffic for a
variety of devices including the Amazon Echo, Nest Security Camera, and the Belkin
WeMo Switch (see Figure 3 below). Acar et al. (2018) found a small discrepancy in
traffic size between the Wemo Insight Switch being turned from on to off and from off to
on (see Figure 4 below).

Figure 3. Network traffic send and receive rates corresponding to user activities
(Apthorpe, Reisman, Sundaresan, et al., 2017)
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Figure 4. Wemo Insight Switch’s network traffic volume when switched from on to off
and then from off to on (Acar et al., 2018)

This type of attack is similar to the research in this paper, but differs in that the
attack in this research is accomplished through an account takeover by someone who is
not connected to the home network and is performing the attack from somewhere on the
Internet. Therefore, this research tested the worthiness of each of these characteristics. An
in-depth explanation of each characteristic listed above can be found in the
Methodologies section of this paper.
The attack outlined in this research is more in-line with typical account takeover
attacks. This involves the malicious actor leveraging a user’s credentials. In this attack
the malicious actor is not normally connected to the user’s home wireless network to
perform the attack. Extensive research of current journal and conference papers on
intrusion detection systems for smart home devices did not identify any research of how
to prevent remote attackers who have gained compromised credentials, to take over smart
home devices. This research intended to fill that gap.
Summary
Smart home devices are rapidly being added to houses around the world.
Researchers have discovered many concerning vulnerabilities with smart home devices
and have demonstrated several successful attacks on the devices. Domestic abusers, who
have been using technology to harass their victims, have started to adopt smart home
devices as a new attack vector.

33

Domestic abusers have followed the low-tech approach of commandeering a
smart home device via a compromised username and password. This method is effective
due to the architecture of most smart home devices, which involves state change requests
of smart home devices going through the device’s Cloud server, then passed to the smart
home device. Blocking a smart home device’s connection to the Cloud service is
ineffective since researchers have determined that taking this approach renders most
smart home devices useless.
Intrusion detection systems have proved useful to most traditional types of active
attacks against smart home devices. Passive attacks can be successful in learning about a
households’ activities by learning the traffic patterns generated by smart home devices. A
compromised cannot be defended against with the methods researchers developed for
passive or active attacks. This is also true for access control lists. ACLs are effective at
restricting what type of access a user has to a device based on a number of factors. A
compromised account is outside the scope of an ACL.
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Chapter 3
Methodology

Overview
This research was carried out following an experimental design through a lab
experiment. The main goal was to identify state change requests sent over a network from
an app on a smart phone to the smart home device’s Cloud site. Researchers have found
that the payload of this network traffic is typically encrypted (Acar et al., 2018; Alrawi et
al., 2019a; Apthorpe, Reisman, Sundaresan, et al., 2017; Bezawada et al., 2018; Junges et
al., 2019; Miettinen et al., 2017a; OConnor et al., 2019; Ren et al., 2019a; Sivanathan et
al., 2017; Subahi & Theodorakopoulos, 2019). Therefore, network traffic patterns were
studied to see if state change requests generate identifiable patterns.
This was accomplished by selecting specific attributes, also known as features,
which can be represented as follows.
𝐸" = {𝐹, 𝐷, 𝐿}
E, represents the extracted features and T represents the time interval. F are the
features of the traffic sent to the smart home device to initiate a state change, 𝐹 =
{𝑓! , 𝑓$ , … , 𝑓& } in which 𝑓' (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛) represents a feature. D is the set of smartphones
and tablets, and L is used to denote location of where a change request originated. The
end goal was to identify the combination of features, F, and machine learning classifiers
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which are the most successful in identifying state changes hidden in the encrypted
payloads across several types of smart home devices.
The Scikit-Learn platform was used for machine learning (Scikit-Learn 0.22.2,
2020). This included the Juypter notebook to store and run the machine learning tasks,
Python as the primary programming language, and the numpy and pandas libraries
(NumPy — NumPy, 2020; Pandas 1.0.3, 2020).
Four popular smart home devices were included in this research. The criteria for
selecting these devices is that they must connect to the home WiFi network and must be
controlled by its corresponding Cloud server. Additionally, at least one device was
included from the following rough categories: 1) a device that has a simple behavior
(turns on and off), 2) a device with a complex behavior (can be turned on for a set
amount of time), and 3) sends a large amount of data (i.e. video camera). The selection of
these smart home devices depended on the availability of publicly available datasets from
previous research. The publicly available datasets did not prove adequate, meaning it did
not having enough network traffic captures of smartphone to smart device interactions, so
simulation data was created. This was accomplished by setting up our own lab with the
smart home devices on a home WiFi network and capturing the network traffic while
generating numerous state change behaviors of each smart home device.
This research followed the typical steps involved in training a machine learning
algorithm. An overview of the steps is listed below with a detailed explanation of each
step following this list.
1. Get the data
a. List the data needed and how much is needed
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b. Capture or acquire the network traffic
c. Sample a test set
2. Explore the data
a. Create a copy of the data for exploration
b. Study each attribute and its characteristics
c. Identify the target attribute
d. Label the data
e. Convert the data for Scikit-Learn
f. Visualize the data
g. Study the correlations between attributes
h. Identify the promising transformations
3. Prepare the data
a. Data cleaning
b. Feature selection, feature engineering, and feature scaling
i.

𝐹 = {𝑓! , 𝑓$ , … , 𝑓& } in which 𝑓' (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛) represents a
feature

ii. One goal of this research is to identify subsets of F,
represented by R, that can be used to identify state changes
effectively and efficiently. 𝑅 = {𝑟! , 𝑟$ , … , 𝑟( } in which
𝑟' (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) represents a subset of F
4. Identify promising models
a. Train many models using standard parameters, represented as the
set 𝐶 = {𝑐! , 𝑐$ , … , 𝑐) } in which 𝑐(1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘) represents a
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classifier. The goal is to identify which subset S (S ⊆ C), when
trained with R performs the best
b. Measure and compare their performance
c. Analyze the most significant variables for each algorithm
d. Analyze the types of errors the models make
e. Repeat the five previous steps for each smart home device’s
network traffic and then for all of the smart home devices’ network
traffic combined
f. Select the top three to five most promising models
5. Fine-Tune the System
a. Fine-tune the hyperparameters using cross-validation
b. Try Ensemble methods
c. Estimate the generalization error
(Géron, 2019)
Step 1: Get the data
There were two main datasets to evaluate. One dataset was provided by Alrawi et
al. (2019). The researchers evaluated 45 devices from several disparate categories
including appliances, cameras, home assistants, media and network devices. They
collected network traffic over a period of 13 days which resulted in 150 GB of data.
The second dataset came from the work of Ren et al. (2019). The full dataset
includes network traffic captured from 81 different smart home devices located in labs in
the United States and the United Kingdom. Over the period of a month they conducted
34,586 automated and manual experiments on the smart home devices.
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As mentioned previously, the publicly available datasets did not provide enough
instances of encrypted network traffic between the smart home device’s app and the
smart home device’s Cloud site so the data was supplemented by generating and
capturing our own network traffic. The network traffic generated by the smart home
device apps were captured using tcpdump on the home router (in this case a router
running the OpenWRT operating system) (OpenWrt Project, 2020; Tcpdump, 2017). It
was necessary to generate our own supplemental network captures, so the same method
was used as Apthorpe et al (2017). Each device was isolated on its own network, and all
possible means of triggering the device were explored.
Once all the device’s states were triggered, the network traffic generated by the
device was analyzed for uniqueness. The same behavior was triggered and again
compared to the previous network traffic. A similar method was used by Copos et al.
(2016), in which they found that packets of a certain size were sent when the Nest motion
sensor was tripped which allowed them to determine with 88% accuracy that the sensor
was tripped.
Smart home devices can be roughly grouped into three, possibly overlapping,
categories: 1) those with simple behaviors (i.e. smart plugs which can be turned on or
off), 2) more complex behaviors (i.e. smart watering systems that be set to turn on for a
set amount of time), and 3) those that send large amount of data (i.e. Alexa sending a
voice recording and Ring sending a video clip). Experiments with smart home devices
from each of these categories were conducted. The list of devices includes: 1) TP-Link
smart plug (simple behavior), 2) the Belkin WeMo switch (simple behavior), 3) the
Chamberlain myQ Garage Door opener (simple behavior), 4) Nest camera (large amount
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of data), 5) Rachio Smart Sprinkler Controller (complex behavior). These devices were
selected because they are popular smart home devices and several of them were used in
the publicly available dataset from Alrawi et al.(2019) and Ren et al.(2019). Some of the
devices listed proved to be less than ideal candidates.
Step 2: Explore the data
Researchers have used the tool Zeek (formerly known as Bro) to assist in
interpreting the network traffic (Copos et al., 2016b; Paxson, 1999). Zeek can be used to
read in a pcap file and then produce a list of all connections including information about
the source, destination, protocol used for the connection, duration, and number or bytes
sent. Therefore, Zeek was used in this research to examine connection patterns in the
publicly provided network capture files from Alrawi et al.(2019) and Ren et al.(2019).
This helped identify which packet captures, and specifically which parts of those packet
captures, involved an interaction between a smart device and the smart home device’s
Cloud server. Once these interactions were identified, Wireshark was be used to study
each attribute and its characteristics; the IP address of the Cloud site was identified, the
domain that the IP belonged to, the protocol used for communication, if the payload was
encrypted or not, the size of the payload, and how many transactions occurred during
each session (Wireshark, 2020).
Once all of the possible smart device state changes were correlated to specific
network traffic, the traffic was labeled to start training a machine learning algorithm. This
step was particularly challenging since the publicly available data is not currently labeled.
It was necessary to identify patterns in the encrypted network traffic indicative of a state
change request to a smart home device. This involved making state change requests on
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smart home devices in our test environment and comparing the traffic generated for each
state change request to the traffic in the publicly available network traffic. The traffic
patterns in the publicly available network traffic that match the traffic patterns in our test
environment would have been labeled as state changes. Unfortunately, no state changes
made by a smartphone were identified in the publicly available dataset. Therefore, a lab
environment was set up and traffic was generated on the smart home devices listed
above.
The steps to identify the state changes included exporting the network capture out
of Wireshark as a comma separated value (CSV) file and then importing it into Microsoft
Excel (Microsoft Excel, 2019). In Excel, a filter was applied to the data allowing us to
separate network packets that include state change requests sent from the smart device to
the Cloud site and unrelated network packets. A column was created in Excel to for the
label. The value “1” was inserted into the label column for packets that involve a state
change and a “0” for the rest.
Once this task was completed, the CSV was ready to be loaded into the Jupyter
environment (Jupyter Notebook 6.0.3, 2020). This was done with a Pandas function
which reads the csv into a Pandas dataframe. The Pandas dataframe is a two dimensional
data structure that is comparable to the structure of a spreadsheet; the dataframe is
comprised of rows and columns. The Pandas dataframe is the main container type used
for all phases of machine learning (i.e. the cleaning, training, and analyzing steps) in the
Scikit-Learn platform (Géron, 2019).
Step 3: Prepare the data – Feature Selection
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One of crucial steps with machine learning, and therefore this research, was
feature selection, formally represented as the set 𝐹 = {𝑓! , 𝑓$ , … , 𝑓& } in which
𝑓' (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛) represents a feature. Feature selection involved identifying all of the
relevant characteristics of the home network traffic that were indicative of a state change
request sent from a smart home device’s app running on a smart device to a smart home
device’s Cloud site. State changes could be found in the payload of the packet. Therefore,
network traffic attributes were selected as features to effectively train machine learning
algorithms to identify patterns indicative of smart device state change requests. Table 1,
below, summarizes the promising features, by category, including a reference to the
research that implemented said feature.
Table 1
Network Data Flow Features
Category
Feature
Statistical
Statistical
Statistical
Statistical
Statistical
Statistical

Statistical

Average bytes per session from the client
and from the server
Maximum bytes per session from the
client, and from the server
Standard deviation of bytes between
server sequences
Standard deviation of bytes between IoT
device sequences
Median absolute deviation of packet size
Mean and standard deviation of the
amount of traffic (bytes) sent or received
by the device in consecutive s-second
samples
Burstiness
the proximity of arrival instances within
each other plus the variance between each
arrival. It is measured by examining the
variance in terms of both payload size and
inter-arrival times

Reference
OConnor et al. (2019);
Ren et al. (2019)
OConnor et al. (2019);
Ren et al. (2019)
OConnor et al. (2019)
OConnor et al. (2019)
Acar et al. (2018)
Apthorpe, Reisman, &
Feamster (2017)

OConnor et al. (2019)
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Aggregated

Synthesized

Aggregate bytes per session from the
client and the server
Kurtosis with respect to packet sizes and
inter-arrival times
The distribution of inter-packet
intervals
Skewness with respect to packet sizes
and inter-arrival times
deciles of the distribution with respect
to packet sizes and inter-arrival times
IAT bin (a representation of traffic
rate) bin index of packet inter-arrival
time (IAT) using three bins: < 0:001
ms, 0:001 ms to 0:05 ms, and > 0:05
ms
Mean inter-arrival time

Synthesized

The total number of packets in a flow

Apthorpe et al. (2017);
Bezawada et al. (2018)

total time of connection

OConnor et al. (2019)

The proportion of SYN and ACK
packets per flow
Flow is a set of packets associated
with a 5-tuple of sender_ip,
recipient_ip, sender_port,
recipient_port, and protocol within
some time window
Packet sequence information

Apthorpe et al. (2017)

Aggregated
Aggregated
Aggregated
Synthesized
Synthesized

Synthesized
Protocol
specific

Protocol
specific
Protocol
specific
Protocol
specific
Protocol
specific

Synchronicity, the observed
measurements that describe how a
client and server take turns sending
data
Synchronicity within the context of a
session
Synchronicity of server sequences per
session

OConnor et al. (2019)
Ren et al. (2019)
Apthorpe, Reisman,
Sundaresan, et al. (2017)
Ren et al. (2019)
Ren et al. (2019)
Nguyen et al. (2019);
Subahi &
Theodorakopoulos (2019)
Acar et al. (2018)

Subahi & Theodorakopoulos
(2019)
OConnor et al. (2019)
OConnor et al. (2019)
OConnor et al. (2019)

It is important to know if the same features, trained with the same machine
learning classifiers, provide the best results across all types of smart home devices. Or is
possible that the results will vary based upon the type of smart home device? The goal
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was to identify which features, F, combined with which machine learning algorithm,
provide the most optimal identification of state changes, across all types of smart home
device. In other words, identify the subsets of F, denoted as R, that performs best with a
machine learning algorithm:
𝑅 = {𝑟! , 𝑟$ , … , 𝑟( } in which 𝑟' (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) represents a subset of F
Statistical features have proven to work well with devices that have simple
behaviors. As mentioned above, Acar et al. (2018), found that traffic size could be used
to identify when a smart plug was turned on and off. Junges et al. (2019), were successful
in determining state change requests of smart plugs and smart lamps by using the
encrypted payload size as their main feature.
To the best of our knowledge, there is a lack of published research that has
focused primarily on identifying the behavior of smart home devices with complex
behaviors. Complex behavior of a smart home device is defined here as being able to
choose to switch the device between more than two states (i.e. more than turning a light
from on to off). An example is the Rachio smart sprinkler system which allows the user
to turn the sprinklers on for five minutes. The Rachio accepts the request, turns the water
on, then responds back when the five minutes of watering has completed. In order train a
machine learning algorithm to identify this pattern, more complex features must be used
than the statistical features described above. In this case, it was believed that synthesized
features, such as total number of packets in a flow, would be most useful. Therefore,
network traffic flow was a big focus. This helped identify time intervals between TLS
sessions, which is important when identifying when a smart device state change request
involves several interactions between the smart home device and the user.
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Ren et al. (2019) found that aggregated features are effective in inferring
interactions from devices that that send a large amount of data such as cameras,
televisions, and audio devices. Although their goal was not to identify the optimal
classifier, but to simply understand if the devices’ activities are inferable.
Most fine-grained features did not help with identifying device state changes.
However, several assisted in identifying the smart device requesting the change and the
smart home device’s Cloud site that the change request is sent to. Therefore, some finegrained features were selected such as destination IP address and source MAC address.
Source and destination ports were also used as features to identify when an encrypted
payload is being sent.
The combinations of all the aforementioned features were tested in order to
identify the ideal combination that performs best across all types of smart home devices.
This involved testing several combinations of the feature sets as highlighted in Table 2
below.
Table 2
Possible Combinations of Feature Types
Feature type A
Feature type B

Feature type C

Statistical

Synthesized

Aggregated

Statistical

Aggregated

Protocol specific

Statistical

Protocol specific

Synthesized

Step 4: Identify promising models
The sets of features were used to train machine learning algorithms, also known
as classifiers. Tests were conducted to see which machine learning algorithm, combined
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with statistical, aggregated, synthesized or protocol specific features, performed best with
traffic from smart home devices that have simple behavior, complex behavior, and send a
lot of data. The classifiers can be formally represented as the set 𝐶 = {𝑐! , 𝑐$ , … , 𝑐) } in
which 𝑐(1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘) represents a classifier. The goal was to identify which c, when
trained with f performs the best:
S ⊆C
S represents a subset of classifiers that produces the most accurate predictor out of
the tested classifiers combined with the R, the selected features used to train the
classifiers.
Acar et al. (2018) obtained an 88% accuracy of correctly detecting activities using
Random Forest (RF) and 91% using KNN. Ren et al. (2019) trained a RF machine
learning classifier. Junges et al. (2019) were able to train a KNN classifier to identify
actions with a high accuracy of up to 98.4%. Therefore, this research project used the
KNN algorithm to correlate smart device activity to network traffic, and explored other
supervised learning algorithms such as RF and naïve Bayes.

Step 5: Fine-Tune the System
Several evaluations were performed to test the accuracy of the predictor. A root
mean square error will be computed using numpy’s built in mean_squared_error function
(Géron, 2019). The function is:
%

1
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸(𝑋, ℎ) = + /(ℎ(𝑥 (")) − 𝑦 (") )$
𝑔
"&'
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g is the number of instances in the dataset that are measuring the RMSE on. 𝑥 (") is
a vector of all of the feature values of the ith instance in the dataset, with 𝑦 (") representing
its label. X is a matrix containing all of the feature values of all instances in the dataset. h,
also called the hypotheses, is the system’s prediction function.
This ran against all of the predictors; several predictors were created by
combining features and running them through various machine learning classifiers.
Also, Scikit-Learn’s K-fold cross validation feature was implemented. This
feature randomly splits the training set into a set number of folds, which are distinct
subsets of the training set. It then trains a classifier a set number of times, choosing a
different fold for evaluation and using the other folds for training. The output is an array
containing the evaluation score for all of the runs.
To identify correlations between features the standard correlation coefficient
between every pair of features was computed. When the results were close to one, there
was a strong positive correlation and when the result was close to negative one, there was
a strong negative correlation. Scikit-Learn’s corr() function was used to perform this
calculation.
One very quick and effective test for accuracy is called the precision of the
classifier. Precision is the accuracy of the positive predictors. It is represented by the
equation:
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =

𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃

TP is the number of true positives and FP is the number of false positives.
Precision is usually used in conjunction with recall, also known as sensitivity or the true
positive rate (TPR). It is calculated with the formula:
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𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =

𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁

FN is the number of false negatives.
The harmonic mean of precision and recall, which is the 𝐹! score, was computed.
It is different than precision in that it gives much more weight to low values. This results
in only getting a high 𝐹! score if both recall and precision are high. The formula is:
𝐹! = 2 ×

𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝑇𝑃
=
𝐹𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝑇𝑃 +
2

Finally, a confusion matrix was used to count the number of incorrect
classifications. For example, it showed the number of times network traffic was
incorrectly identified as containing a state change request for a smart home device.
Scikit-Learn’s cross_val_predict function will be used for the confusion matrix.
Preliminary Experiment
The dataset used for this preliminary experiment came from the work of Ren et al.
(2019). A test case focused on network traffic generated by a Wemo plug over two
separate dates. The researchers generated several GetBinaryState events in which the
Wemo plug responded with its current state which is either on or off. The traffic and the
payload were not encrypted, making it easy to identify the exact packets responsible for
the GetBinaryState events. This was used to create an accurate label for the data.
The basis of this research was to learn the state change hidden in an encrypted
payload. Since an encrypted payload cannot be read, it would not make sense to include
an unencrypted payload in this test data. Therefore, the field containing the payload
information was removed from the dataset prior to any training or testing.
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The packet captures from April 24, 2019 was used to train the Random Forest
Regressor and the packet capture from April 25, 2019 was used to test the resulting
predictor. This was all performed in the Jupyter notebook environment using the Pandas
and Numpy Python libraries to load and prepare the dataset. Once trained, the accuracy of
the predictor will be tested using the mean square error formula. The result was zero,
which indicates a perfect prediction. To double check this, the predicted output was
compared to the test case and they were both identical.
The next step was to learn which features were the most important in training the
predictor. In other words, which features had the highest correlations. The results, listed
in Table 3 below, indicate that the Source and Destination ports are more correlated (.15)
to GetBinaryState than Length is (.08). This is surprising since previous research placed a
high emphasis on payload size to indicate a state change. This was be re-tested and
analyzed during the research portion of this project.
Table 3
Correlation Matrix
No.

Time

Length

Src port

Dest port

GetBinary
State

No.

1.000000

0.999861

0.009366

0.019650

0.017530

0.001433

Time

0.999861

1.000000

0.009378

0.019745

0.017695

0.001206

Length

0.009366

0.009378

1.000000

-0.374397

-0.405949

0.086608

Src
port

0.019650

0.019745

-0.374397

1.000000

0.841381

0.158049
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No.

Time

Length

Src port

Dest port

GetBinary
State

Dest
port

0.017530

0.017695

-0.405949

0.841381

1.000000

0.157310

GetBin
aryStat
e

0.001433

0.001206

0.086608

0.158049

0.157310

1.000000

This preliminary experiment showed promise that the research methods listed
above were valid. It was important during the experiment portion of this research, to test
several different features, with several different machine learning classifiers, to discover
the optimal combination, to identify state changes hidden in the encrypted payload of
network traffic. This research successfully discovered this combination.
Resources
Two main datasets were evaluated; one dataset provided by Alrawi et al. (2019)
and the other by Ren et al. (2019). Evaluation of the datasets were done using Wireshark,
Zeek, and Microsoft Excel. Since more data was necessary, network traffic was captured
in a lab environment using tcpdump running on an OpenWRT router. The lab
environment includeed the following smart home devices: Belkin WeMo switch, TP-Link
WiFi Smart Plug, Rachio Smart WiFi Sprinkler Controller, the Chamberlain myQ garage
door opener, and Amazon’s Ring video camera.
Scikit-Learn was used to prepare the data, train the classifiers, and fine tune the
system. Scikit-Learn contains several Python libraries that enable us to do this.
Summary
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In summary, the research for the detection of rogue manipulation of smart home
devices, involved the following steps:
1. Identify potential network traffic features that will enable the identification of
smart home device state changes hidden in the encrypted payloads
2. Explore the publicly available network traffic datasets provided by Ren et al.
(2019) and Alrawi et al. (2019)
3. Generate our own network traffic in our lab environment with a set of smart home
devices
4. Train several machine learning algorithms with the identified feature sets
5. Evaluate the results of the trainings
6. Identify the machine learning algorithm, trained with one of the feature sets, that
performs the best across all of the selected smart home devices
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Chapter 4
Results

Overview
The main goal of this research was to categorize encrypted network traffic
patterns originating from the user’s WiFi connected smart phone or tablet, indicative of
state change requests of smart home devices. To accomplish this goal, the research was
conducted in three major phases:
1) focused on analyzing the publicly available network data captures provided by
Alrawi et al. (2019), called YourThings, and the dataset published by Ren et al.
(2019) called MonIoTrPublic,
2) involved capturing the network traffic of several smart home devices’ apps and
identifying the traffic patterns indicative of a state change request,
3) included identifying network traffic features, using those features to train
machine learning algorithms, evaluating the results of the trainings, and
identifying the machine learning algorithm that performs the best across all of
the selected smart home devices. The results of each phase will be addressed in
this chapter.
Phase 1 – Analysis of Publicly Available Datasets
Publicly available network traffic captures of smart home devices were rigorously
searched for during the literature review portion of this project. This included contacting
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researchers who had published papers related to smart home devices. This resulted in the
successful identification and obtainment of two datasets.
One dataset was provided by Alrawi et al. (2019) as part of their YourThings
initiative. The researchers evaluated 45 devices from several disparate categories
including appliances, cameras, home assistants, media and network devices. They
collected network traffic over a period of 13 days which resulted in over one thousand
separate pcap files totaling 150 GB of data. The second dataset came from the work of
Ren et al. (2019). The full dataset, referred to as MonIoTrPublic, includes network traffic
captured from 81 different smart home devices located in labs in the United States and
the United Kingdom. In-depth analysis of both datasets was performed.
The YourThings dataset presented some significant challenges due to both the
quantity of pcap files and total data collected. Therefore, it was determined that a
database should be used since this is the best method to store and query large quantities
of data. A fork of the MySQL database, called MariaDB was selected as the database. All
of the pcap files were loaded into MariaDB. This involved converting the pcap file to csv
format, which results in the loss of a significant amount of detail. However, all of the
relevant data to identify state changes was maintained; the csv file contained information
about the source and destination IP addresses, ports, protocol used, bytes sent, bytes
received, and the information field that includes a summary of data sent in the packet.
The main goal in evaluating the YourThings data in the MySQL database was to
identify state change requests made from a smartphone or tablet. The SmartThings
researchers included a mapping of device to IP address which helped with the initial
identification of network traffic from the researcher’s iPad and iPhone. Based on the
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mapping, SQL queries were created to determine on which of the capture days’ both the
iPad and iPhone were used. Results showed that the iPad was used all four of the capture
days (3/20/18, 3/21/18, 3/28/18, and 4/15/18) and the iPhone was used two of the days
(3/21/18 and 3/28/18).
The next step was to identify network traffic from the iPhone and iPad to either
one of the smart home devices or the smart home devices’ Cloud sites. Once again, a
SQL query was used which, not surprisingly, showed that both the iPhone and iPad
generated a significant amount of outbound traffic to a multitude of various external IP
addresses. It was not immediately apparent who owned the external IP addresses. To
determine this, the Cloud sites for several of the smart home devices were identified, then
a whois search was performed on each to determine who the IP range belonged to. This
did not provide much useful information; most of the selected smart home devices host
their Cloud server with Amazon’s AWS service. Therefore, most of the whois queries
resulted in AWS as the owner of the IP address. This presented the challenge of
differentiating traffic bound for the disparate smart device Cloud sites. Fortunately, when
the smart device’s app on the iPad or iPhone is used, it generates a DNS query for the
smart device’s Cloud site. Using the database to track down DNS queries from the
iPhone and iPad and Wireshark to open the corresponding pcap file, the Cloud site for
each of the smart devices was identified.
Once the smart devices’ Cloud sites were identified, it was possible to tell each
time that the smart device’s app was used on the iPhone or iPad. This only showed that
the app sent traffic to the smart device’s Cloud site, not exactly what was sent (i.e. was
the app used to turn the smart switch on and off?). To determine if a state change was
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requested, it was necessary to look for incoming traffic to the smart home devices and
then see if that correlated to outbound traffic from the iPhone and iPad to the smart
device’s Cloud site. Using the previously stated method of discovering each IP address
and which smart device it belonged to, it was possible to identify each time a smart
device talked to its Cloud server.
Unfortunately, for all of the smart home devices listed above, there was not one
instance when both the smart device’s app and the smart device were sending or
receiving network traffic within the same timeframe (i.e. with five minutes of each other).
In other words, it did not appear that a state change was requested on the app since there
was a lack of traffic during the same timeframe between the smart device and its Cloud
site. To reiterate, for the traffic that spanned the four capture days, there were hundreds of
instances of outbound traffic from several smart devices’ apps to the Cloud sites and
hundreds of instances of traffic to and from the smart devices to their Cloud sites. Yet,
none of traffic overlapped in common timeframes.
One possible reason for this lack of correlation could be that the smart hubs and
motion sensors used in the project generated state changes to the smart home devices,
instead of the state changes being requested by the app on the iPhone. The smart hubs
and motion sensors include: the Samsung SmartThings Hub, Phillips HUE Hub, Insteon
Hub, Belkin WeMo Motion Sensor, Wink Hub, Caseta Wireless Hub, Google Home, and
Apple HomePod. These hubs and sensors are designed to directly control the smart home
devices without the end user controlling the device via an app.
It is possible to view the smart hub setup as delegitimizing this research since the
intention of this project was to focus on state changes initiated from a smartphone.
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However, it could also be argued that the setup used in the YourThings research project is
advanced and not typical of most smart home device users today. The hub and sensor
setup would require home users to purchase additional equipment, for several hundred
dollars, plus the home user would need to know how to program the hubs and sensors to
perform certain tasks for each corresponding event. This may be out of the technical
know-how of most home users, since Fu et al., (2017) found that most home users are not
tech savvy.
Despite the limited use of hubs, it is possible that the techniques used in this
research could be applied to identify state changes sent from a hub to a smart device’s
Cloud site. Just like smart phones, hubs send state change requests over the home WiFi
network to the device’s Cloud site. Therefore, machine learning algorithms could be
trained to recognize state change patterns sent via encrypted network traffic from hubs
similarly to the success this research had with state changes sent from smart phones.
Additionally, there is a growing number of smart assistants which allow users to
control their smart home devices via voice commands. For example, Amazon Alexa can
be configured to allow a user to turn a smart switch on simply by speaking the command
to the Alexa. The Alexa, just like a smart phone and a hub, then sends the state change
request to the smart home device’s Cloud site over encrypted WiFi network traffic. Once
again, it is possible that this research is applicable to discovering state changes sent from
a smart assistant.
The evaluation of the MonIoTrPublic dataset was accomplished in just a few
steps. The MonIoTrPublic dataset contained network traffic for over twenty smart home
devices, but it did not include any network traffic from a smartphone or tablet.
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Phase 2 – Capturing and Identifying Network Traffic of Smart Home Devices
Since the two publicly available datasets did not contain any identifiable state
changes made from a smartphone or tablet to a smart home device, it was necessary to set
up a lab to capture this traffic. The focus of this research was to identify state changes
across three types of categories of smart home devices: 1) has a simple behavior (turns on
and off), 2) has a complex behavior (can be turned on for a set amount of time), and 3)
sends a large amount of data (i.e. video camera). Therefore, smart home devices were
selected across those three categories.
Selecting the Smart Home Devices
For the simple behavior, the TP-Link WiFi Plug and the Chamberlain myQ
Garage Opener were selected. The TP-Link WiFi Plug is only capable of turning a switch
on and off, while the Chamberlain myQ Garage Opener’s sole purpose is to open and
close a garage door. The Rachio Smart Sprinkler system is capable of turning the
sprinklers on and off for varying amounts of time, which is a more complex behavior
than simply turning something on and off or opening and closing something, so it was
placed in the complex behavior category. Finally, Amazon’s Ring video camera
constitutes a device that sends a large amount of data which fits the final category.
Two other devices were initially selected but later excluded due to not being able
to reliably identify their state change requests. The Belkin WeMo Switch, which was
used in the preliminary tests for this research, previously sent state changes in
unencrypted traffic but has since improved their security and now encrypts their traffic.
All of the other smart home devices in this research encrypt their traffic as well, but
identifiable patterns enabled the identification of state changes in their traffic. The Belkin
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WeMo Switch did not exhibit identifiable patterns that would allow for the labeling of
state changes necessary to a train machine learning algorithm. This is also true for the
Fujitsu Mini-Split heating and air conditioner. This device was initially included since it
allows the user to change several different settings of the system, putting it in the
complex behavior category. To include these two devices in future research it would be
necessary to either decrypt the network traffic or work with the manufacturer to
understand how their systems function.
Table 4
Smart Home Devices with Specifications Used in this Research
Device
Firmware Functionality
App
version
version
TP-Link WiFi 1.5.6
Turn a plug on and
2.23
Plug
off
Chamgerlain
myQ Garage
Opener
Rachio Smart
Sprinkler
system
Amazon Ring
video camera
Belkin WeMo
Switch
Fujitsu MiniSplit system

Utilized in
research
Yes, state
change traffic
identified
A.0.4.12
Open and close a
5.158.19859 Yes, state
garage door
change traffic
identified
5-115
Turn on a sprinkler
4.1.12
Yes, state
system to various
change traffic
amount of time
identified
CamSwitch to live mode
5.28.0
Yes, state
1.4.1.5200 to stream a live
change traffic
feed
identified
2.00.11420 Turn a plug on and
1.25.1
No, unable to
off
reliably identify
the state
changes
2.4.5.1
Control a heating
3.1.0
No, unable to
and air system by
reliably identify
setting the
the state
temperature, fan
changes
speed, and more

Capturing the Network Traffic
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The environment and method used to collect network traffic were based on the
same methods used by Ren et al. (2019) and Alrawi et al. (2019). The environment, based
on the lab setup of Alrawi et al. (2019), consisted of a GL.iNet Mini Travel Router
running OpenWRT, an iPhone, and smart home device. During testing, the iPhone and
the smart home device were configured to connect to the mini travel router (see Figure 5
below).

Figure 5. Lab configuration with an iPhone running the smart home device’s app, the
smart home device connected to a Mini Travel Router, and the Mini Travel Router
connected to smart device’s Cloud site(s)
The method used to capture the traffic followed what Ren et al. (2019) termed
interaction experiments. This involved interacting with the IoT device via the app on the
iPhone. For each interaction, the device would be turned on, and then two minutes later
the network capture would be initiated. The capture would continue during the entire time
the state change, or changes, took to complete, then after an additional 5-15 seconds, the
capture would be stopped (Ren et al., 2019b).
The following are the exact steps taken for each network capture:
1. Change the iPhone’s WiFi settings to connect to the mini router
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2. Configure the smart home device to connect to the mini router
3. SSH into the mini router from a MacBook Pro
4. Launch the tcpdump utility on the mini router
5. Disconnect the MacBook Pro from the mini router
6. Launch the smart device’s app on the iPhone
7. In the app, make a state change to the smart home device (i.e. turn the smart
switch off)
a. In some cases, repeatedly perform this action
b. In some cases, don’t perform any state changes in the app which will be
used to differentiate between state change traffic and all other traffic
c. Record the time the state change was made
8. SSH back into the mini router from the MacBook Pro and copy the pcap file to
the MacBook Pro for analysis
Identifying State Changes
The next step was to analyze the network traffic in order to identify the state
changes that were made. To accomplish this, the network analysis tools Zeek and
Wireshark were leveraged. Zeek was used to summarize each connection. The utility
creates several files detailing information about the network traffic such as the source and
destination of each connection, how much data was sent, the protocol that was used, and
several other informative fields (see Appendix A).
All of the outbound connections from the iPhone were analyzed using Zeek,
which includes a feature to parse pcap files creating several log files (Copos et al., 2016a;
Dai et al., 2019; Flosbach et al., 2019; Paxson, 1999). This research followed the example
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of Flosbach et al. (2019), who successfully parsed pcap files using Zeek. One of the log
files that was created, the conn.log files, records connection information of the network
and transport layer including information such as when a connection occurred, for how
long, the protocol used, and several other details (see example data in Table 5 below).
This information was used to identify traffic patterns for each device. A detailed account
of how each pattern was identified for each device is detailed in the sections below. Once
the state change patterns were identified, they would be validated by matching the state
change patterns in the network traffic with the recorded times a state change was made on
the app on the iPhone. If the times matched up, then it was more likely that the identified
state change was a true positive and not a false positive.
Table 5
Example of fields and values produced by Zeek on network traffic sent between an iPhone
a smart device’s Cloud site
Field
time stamp
source IP
source port
destination IP
destination port
protocol
service
duration
orig_bytes
resp_bytes
conn_state
orig_pkts
orig_ip_bytes
resp_pkts
resp_ip_bytes
server name

Value
2020-06-26T14:23:21-0700
192.168.8.248
55451
13.83.97.206
443
tcp
ssl
0.372338
1152
7246
S1 (Connection established, not terminated)
24
3552
26
15836
api.myqdevice.com
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To add further evidence that the traffic pattern was indicative of a state change,
network traffic sent between the smart home device and its Cloud site was analyzed.
Since the mini router captured all of the network traffic, not just the traffic between the
smartphone and the Cloud site, the traffic between the smart home device and the Cloud
site was contained in the same conn.log file as was used in the previous step. The
timestamp of the identified state change event was correlated with the timestamp of a
connection, or connections, made from the smart home device to its Cloud site (see Table
6 below). If the identified state change traffic was sent to the Cloud site within a given
timeframe of traffic being sent between the smart home device and the Cloud site, then
this further legitimizes that it is indeed a state change. Junges et al. found that sessions
are usually within 2.5 seconds of each other (Junges et al., 2019). Therefore, if the state
change request sent from the smartphone and the state change sent from the Cloud to the
smart home device are within 2.5 seconds of each other, then they will be considered
linked.
Table 6
Example of fields and values produced by Zeek on network traffic between a smart device
and its Cloud site
Field
Value
time stamp
2020-06-26T14:23:21-0700
source IP
20.42.27.108
source port
8883
destination IP
192.168.8.206
destination port
50854
protocol
tcp
service (application protocol)
duration
24.947513
orig_bytes
85
resp_bytes
425
conn_state
OTH (No SYN seen, just midstream
traffic)
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orig_pkts
orig_ip_bytes
resp_pkts
resp_ip_bytes
server name

14
730
14
1410
Microsoft Corporation (MSFT)

Once all of the state changes were confirmed a label was added to mark the state
changes. For each device a separate number was used to represent a state change; a one
was used for TP-Link, a two was used for the Ring, a three for the Rachio, and a four was
used for the myQ device. Next, all of the labeled data per device was combined into one
csv file. These files contained the network traffic captures for each device combined with
the captures that did not have state changes.
iPhone versus Android app state change patterns
This research chose to run the smart device’s app on an iPhone and not an
Android device. While it is possible that the Android app is programmed differently, it is
highly unlikely that an entirely separate Cloud infrastructure is implemented since smart
home device manufacturers often leverage software development kits (SDKs) provided
by smart home platform providers, such as Amazon’s AWS IoT service (Zhou et al.,
2019). This would indicate that the Cloud infrastructure remains the same between
smartphone apps, which lends credence to the notion that the mobile app would behave
similarly across platforms.
Identifying State Changes of TP-Link State Changes
The state change requests for the TP-Link WiFi Plug were the easiest out of all
the smart home devices to identify. To establish a pattern, the plug was turned on or off
24 times, spread relatively evenly, over a period of three days (6/20/20, 6/22/20, and
6/26/20). The first pattern that emerged was that whenever the plug was turned from on
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to off or from off to on, a new connection was created between the iPhone and the TPLink WiFi Plug directly. The traffic sent was encrypted, however the values of the
attributes id.resp_p, orig_bytes, and resp_bytes were identical every time the plug was
switched from off to on and from on to off (see Table 7 below). It is worth noting that
there is no guarantee that these values will always remain the same. If the vendor changes
the encryption algorithm that they use or makes alterations to their code controlling the
state changes, it is very likely that different values will be used. However, it is possible
that if the aforementioned changes are made, new patterns will emerge which could then
be used to identify state changes.
Table 7
iPhone to TP-Link WiFi Plug captured traffic of a state change, made on the iPhone
(192.168.8.248), to the TP-Link device(192.168.8.247)
Orig host IP

Resp host IP

192.168.8.248

Orig
port
52791

192.168.8.247

Resp
port
9999

192.168.8.248

52792

192.168.8.247

192.168.8.248

52794

192.168.8.248

52796

Proto
tcp

Dura
tion
0.188

Orig
bytes
106

Resp
bytes
49

Conn
state
SF

9999

tcp

0.250

106

49

SF

192.168.8.247

9999

tcp

0.190

106

49

SF

192.168.8.247

9999

tcp

0.208

106

49

SF

Second, the app would communicate with the following TP-Link Cloud sites: nuse1-wap.tplinkcloud.com, n-wap.tplinkcloud.com, and api.tplinkra.com. If the app was
simply opened and no state change was made, there would be no connection made to the
TP-Link plug. However, the app would connect to the same three TP-Link Cloud sites
listed above.
Identifying State Changes of Chamberlain myQ Garage Opener
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The Chamberlin myQ Garage Opener app behaved more similarly to a typical
smart home device app since it did not communicate directly with the myQ device
directly, instead it communicated state changes to the myQ Cloud site. Notra et al. (2014)
made this observation several years ago, and based on our experiments, this is still true
today. In this experiment ten separate state changes, in the form of opening or closing the
garage door, were captured over four days (6/12/20, 6/13/20, 6/23/20, and 7/20/20). A
pattern emerged in which the app on the iPhone communicated with the account-devicesgdo.myq-cloud.com Cloud site whenever the door was either opened or closed. The
Cloud site consistently had the IP address 13.83.240.23 in our experiments (see Table 8
below). This is unusual behavior since in the network captures for the other smart home
devices, the IP address associated with a Cloud site would change for each capture and
sometimes several different IP addresses were used during the same capture.
Table 8.
Connections involving state changes sent from the iPhone to the myQ Cloud site (this table
is abbreviated, the full table can be found in Appendix A)
Resp host IP

Duration

Orig
bytes

Resp port

Conn state

History

Orig
packets

Orig IP
bytes

Resp
packets

Resp
bytes

13.83.240.23

0.3476

1121

5746

S1

ShADTad
t

24

3490

24

12732

13.83.240.23

0.3241

1248

5746

S1

ShADTad
t

24

3744

24

12732

13.83.240.23

0.4003

1248

5746

S1

ShADTad
t

22

3640

24

12732

13.83.240.23

1.0862

1174

434

S1

ShADTad
t

20

4422

20

1900

13.83.240.23

0.4760

1249

5746

S1

ShADTad
t

24

3746

24

12732

13.83.240.23

0.3590

1249

5746

S1

ShADTad
t

24

3746

24

12732

Another pattern can be observed in the state changes listed in Table 8. Most of
state changes have very similar values across all of the fields, with the outlier being the
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fourth row: the duration, origination bytes sent, response bytes, connection state, history,
origination packets, origination IP bytes, response bytes, and response IP bytes are all in
the same range.
To validate that the pattern was indicative of a state change request, the recorded
time that the state change was made on the iPhone matched up with the time listed in
Table 8 above. Additionally, the time the change request was seen in the traffic from the
iPhone to the Cloud site correlates with traffic identified between the myQ device and the
myQ device’s Cloud site (see Table 9 below). Looking at the actual beginning and ending
times of each connection, Wireshark shows that the app on the iPhone started its
connection at 10:38:06.189218000 PDT and ended it at 10:38:06.430220000 PDT. This
was almost immediately followed by the connection between the myQ device and the
myQ Cloud site which lasted from 10:38:06.4895 PDT until 10:38:31.4370 PDT.
Table 9.
Sample state change traffic sent from the iPhone (192.168.8.248) to the myQ Cloud site
(13.83.240.23) and then from the myQ Cloud site (20.42.27.108) to the myQ device
(192.168.8.206)
Timestamp

Orig host IP

Resp host IP

192.168.8.248

Orig
port
55447

2020-0623T10:38:06
-0700
2020-0623T10:38:06
-0700

Proto

Duration

13.83.240.23

Resp
port
443

20.42.27.108

8883

0.359

Orig
bytes
1249

Resp
bytes
5746

Conn
state
S1

Orig
pkts
24

tcp

192.168.8.206

50854

tcp

24.947

85

425

OTH

14

Identifying State Changes of Ring
The state change for the Ring video camera is the act of putting the Ring into Live
mode allowing the end user to view the live feed from the camera. Analysis of the
network traffic led to the discovery that Ring uses the Real-time Transport Protocol
(RTP) to stream live video. The precursor to RTP traffic is Session Initiation Protocol

66

(SIP) traffic, since it is responsible for setting up the connection between the Ring Cloud
site and the iPhone. Table 10, below, shows the SIP traffic which is indicative of putting
the Ring camera into Live mode captured over four different days (6/24/20, 7/5/20,
7/12/20, and 7/13/20). This traffic was labeled as state changes and used to train the
classifiers which is discussed later in this chapter.
Table 10
Four instances of network traffic containing Ring Live mode requests sent between the
iPhone and the Ring Cloud site
Resp host
34.223.30.139 44.226.215.196 34.223.30.114
IP
Resp port
15064
15064
15064
Proto
tcp
tcp
tcp
Duration
4.544156
14.338902
5.820299
Orig bytes
4392
4437
4088
Resp bytes
7451
7471
6753
Conn state
S1
S1
S1
History
ShADTadttT
ShADTadttT ShADTadtTt
Orig pkts
48
60
48
Orig ip
11304
11922
10648
bytes
Resp pkts
40
48
36
Resp ip
16998
17454
15394
bytes
Identifying State Changes of the Rachio Smart Sprinkler System
The Rachio app was capable of performing a more complex behavior than simply
turning a device on and off or opening or closing a door; the Rachio app allows a user to
choose a sprinkler system zone to run and for how long it is to run. To start a “quick run”
of the sprinklers, the mobile app first communicates with a server that resolves to apiservice-prod.us-west-2.elasticbeanstalk.com. Over SSL it sends out about 1,000 bytes and
then 407 bytes. Next the mobile app sends the request to start the “quick run” by
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connecting to a second Cloud site identified as rach.io and sends 10,000 bytes of data and
receives several tens of thousands of bytes from the Cloud server. One unique finding is
that in some cases both the mobile app and the Rachio device both connected to the same
Cloud site.
This exact behavior was seen for 10 other “quick runs” performed over several
different days (6/12/20, 6/23/20, 6/24/20, 7/5/20, and 7/13/20). To further validate this
state change, a network traffic capture was performed in which the Rachio app on the
mobile app was used to view the watering schedule, but not make any changes (like a
“quick run”). This time the Cloud site identified as rach.io was not accessed, confirming
that the Rachio app performs this identifiable pattern only when performing a quick run.
To summarize, the only time the Cloud site identified as rach.io was accessed was when a
quick run was requested. Therefore, network traffic connections between the mobile app
and rach.io were labeled as state changes for the Rachio (see Table 11 below).
Table 11
Three instances of network traffic containing quick change requests sent between the
iPhone and the Rachio Cloud site
Resp host IP
34.213.56.42 34.213.56.42 52.32.41.198
Resp port
443
443
443
Proto
tcp
tcp
tcp
Duration
23.285352
28.606642
15.913739
Orig bytes
9217
9239
9230
Resp bytes
65852
66284
66837
Conn state
S1
S1
S1
History
ShADTadttT ShADTadttT ShADTadttT
Orig pkts
208
202
190
Orig IP bytes
29178
28934
28316
Resp pkts
212
200
190
Resp IP bytes
142978
144060
144646
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Phase 3 – Train and Evaluate Machine Learning Algorithms to Identify State
Changes
The main goal of this phase was to identify the combination of features, F, and
machine learning classifiers, C, which are the most successful in identifying state changes
hidden in the encrypted payloads across several types of smart home devices. This
involved identifying the features where 𝐹 = {𝑓! , 𝑓$ , … , 𝑓& } in which 𝑓' (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛) F is
comprised of the connection summaries produced by the Zeek utility when run on the
network traffic captures of the interaction experiments. The next step was to identify a
subset of F. This was represented by R, where R = {r! , r$ , … , r* } in which
r+ (1 ≤ i ≤ m), includes the most promising features that were identified to train the
classifier, C. This culminated in identifying which subset S (S ⊆ C) when trained with R
performs the best.
The following steps were used to train the machine learning algorithms: 1) get the
data, 2) explore the data, 3) prepare the data, 4) identify promising models, and 5) fine
tune the system. Step 1 and 2 were covered above in Phase 2 – Capturing and Identifying
Network Traffic of Smart Home Devices. The rest of the steps will be covered here.
Prepare the Data
One of crucial steps of this research is feature selection, F. The goal of this step
was to identify 𝐹 = {𝑓! , 𝑓$ , … , 𝑓& } in which 𝑓' (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛). To ensure a robust feature set,
features were selected from one of the three categories: 1) aggregated, 2) synthesized,
and 3) protocol specific. This resulted in several features being selected from each
category. The list of features selected by category can be found in Table 12 below.
Table 12
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Features selected by category with a description of each feature
Category

Abbreviation Description

Aggregated

orig_pkts

Number of packets that the originator sent

Aggregated

orig_ip_bytes

Aggregated

resp_pkts

Number of IP level bytes that the originator sent
(as seen on the wire, taken from the IP total_length
header field).
Number of packets that the responder sent.

Aggregated

resp_ip_bytes

Synthesized history

Synthesized conn_state
Synthesized duration
Protocol
id.orig_p
specific
Protocol
id.resp_h
specific
Protocol
id.resp_p
specific
Protocol
proto
specific
Protocol
orig_bytes
specific
Protocol
resp_bytes
specific
Identify Promising Models

Number of IP level bytes that the responder sent
(as seen on the wire, taken from the IP total_length
header field).
Records the state history of connections as a string
of letters (such as SO, Connection attempt seen, no
reply, and SF, normal establishment and
termination).
The state of the TCP connection which involves a
combination of one, several, or none of the
following packet types: SYN, ACK, FIN and RST
How long the connection lasted. For 3-way or 4way connection tear-downs, this will not include
the final ACK.
The originator's 4-tuple of endpoint port.
The responder's 4-tuple of endpoint address.
The responder's 4-tuple of endpoint port.
The transport layer protocol of the connection.
The number of payload bytes the originator sent.
The number of payload bytes the responder sent.
See orig_bytes.

The outcome of this step was to identify which c, when trained with f, produces
the most accurate predictor out of the tested classifiers, S ⊆ C. Acar et al. (2018)
obtained an 88% accuracy of correctly detecting activities using Random Forest (RF).
Therefore, the RF algorithm was selected as a starting point. To evaluate the
effectiveness of RF, a 4-fold cross validation was performed. This involved randomly
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splitting the training set into five distinct subsets, training and evaluating the model 4
times, picking a different fold for evaluation each time, and then training on the other 4
folds.
This step involved two phases: 1) training each smart home device individually
with the selected features and RF, and 2) training with the combined set of smart home
devices with all state changes labeled the same. The results all both phases by device are
presented in the following sections.
TP-Link RF Training
The first training of the RF classifier on the TP-Link device involved all 13 of
selected features listed above. RF aggregates and then produces a mean of several
Decision Trees all trained from different random subsets of the network traffic (James et
al., 2013). The training data, the collection of which was described in phase 2 above,
resulted in 430 instances of no state change requests and 24 instances of state change
requests. It is important to reiterate that the training data, collected from the network
traffic of all the smart home devices, contained instances of state changes, smart device
app use but no state changes, and traffic from non-smart device apps. The TP-Link data
was collected over a period of three days (6/20/20, 6/22/20, and 6/26/20). It is believed
that the traffic patterns identified as state changes will stay the same until a major
software change is applied. Therefore, three days of traffic was deemed sufficient.
A 4-fold cross validation was performed resulting in cross validation scores of
100% across all folds. The root mean square score was also 0 across all folds, with a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of zero. The recall, precision, and F! scores were
calculated. These also resulted in perfect scores of 100%.
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The next step was to reduce the number of features by identifying the most
important features used to train the RF classifier. The Jupyter notebook environment
using the Pandas and Numpy Python libraries was used during the entire machine
learning process to identify the most important RF features. The most popular method
used in this environment is an RF grid search (Géron, 2019). An RF grid search asks the
RF classifier to rank each feature by order of importance. The code to perform this task is
contained in the sklearn library GridSearchCV. The parameters for GridSearchCV were
leaf_size set to 30, n_jobs of none, n_neighbors equal to two and p = 2. The results are
listed in Table 13 and Figure 6 below.
Table 13
RF feature importance scores for TP-Link traffic
Feature
Resp bytes
Orig bytes
Orig IP bytes
Resp IP bytes
Resp port
Resp pkts
Orig pkts
Orig port
Duration

RF Feature
Importance Scores for
TP-Link Traffic

re
sp
_
or by
or ig_ tes
ig b
re _ip yte
sp _b s
_i yt
p_ es
id byte
.re s
re sp
sp _p
_
or pk
ig ts
_
id pkt
.o s
r
du ig_p
ra
tio
n

0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0

Value
0.28819812
0.11335768
0.09588693
0.08113802
0.06382875
0.03410074
0.02077022
0.01948455
0.01168756
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Figure 6. Feature importance scores for TP-Link traffic determined by the Random Forest
classifier
The lead field, with over a quarter of the overall importance is resp_bytes,
represents the number of payload bytes the responder sent. This is followed by the
number of payload bytes the originator sent (orig_bytes) and the number of IP level bytes
that the responder sent (orig_ip_bytes). With the feature set reduced down to three
features, F = {resp_bytes, original_bytes, orig_ip_bytes} a 4-fold cross validation with
the RF classifier was run. Once again, this resulted in perfect scores for the cross
validation across all folds, the root mean square score across all folds, and for the
precision, recall, and F! scores. With perfect scores, it was obvious that the three
identified features combined with the RF classifier could not be beat.
myQ RF Training
Once again, the RF classifier was used with all 13 features. Also, the training data
which included 1,216 connections without a state change and eight with a state change,
was collected as outlined in phase 2 above. The identical 4-fold cross validation, used
with the TP-Link device was used and resulted in cross validation scores of 100%,
99.673%, 100%, and 99.346%. The root mean squared errors were 0, .228, 0, and .323.
The mean was .138 with a standard deviation of .142. The precision, recall, and F!
scores were also all 100%. An RF grid search produced the results in Table 14 and Figure
7 below. This indicated that the most important feature is the responding server’s IP
address (id.resp_h), with over a quarter of the overall importance. The next two most
important features are orig_bytes and duration.
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Table 14
RF feature importance scores for myQ
Feature
Resp host IP
Orig bytes
Duration
Orig IP bytes
Resp bytes
Orig pkts
Orig port
Resp IP bytes

Value
0.273051817
0.178656021
0.12654089
0.066071173
0.041034603
0.035720589
0.034761846
0.026948269

RF Feature
Importance Scores
for myQ
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Figure 7. Feature importance scores for myQ traffic determined by the Random Forest
classifier
The RF classifier was run again with the three most important features F =
{id. resp_h, orig_ip_bytes, duration}. This resulted in cross value scores of 99.673%,
100%, 100%, and 99.673%. Root mean square errors of 0, 0.228, 0, and 0.228, a mean of
0.0571, and a standard deviation of 0.099. The precision, recall, and F! scores were also
all 100%. This validated the most important features and resulted in a strong RF
predictor. Attempting to reduce the number of features to less than the three listed above,
resulted in lower precision, recall, and F! scores.
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Ring RF Training
Data collected from phase 2 was used to train the RF classifier. This included all
13 features, with training data that included 463 connections without a state change and
eight with a state change. The same 4-fold cross validation was repeated, resulting in
cross validation scores of 100%, 99.152%, 100%, and 100 %. The root mean squared
errors were 0, .184, 0, and .184. The mean was .054 with a standard deviation of .092.
The precision, recall, and F! scores were also all 100%. An RF grid search produced the
results in Table 15 and Figure 8 below. This indicated that the most important feature is
the responding server’s IP address (id.resp_p), followed by orig_ip_bytes and
resp_ip_bytes.

Table 15
RF feature importance scores for Ring
Feature

Value

Resp port
Orig IP bytes

0.203392693
0.10158929

Resp IP bytes
Duration
Orig bytes

0.09997153
0.042720683
0.035100149

Resp bytes
Orig port

0.034483921
0.033622461
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RF Feature Importance
Scores for Ring
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Figure 8. Feature importance scores for Ring traffic determined by the Random Forest
classifier
The three most important features F = {id. resp_p, orig_ip_bytes, resp_ip_bytes}
were used to train the RF classifier resulting in cross value scores of 100%, 100%,
99.236% and 100 %. Root mean square errors of 0, 0. 0.174, 0, and 0, a mean of 0.043,
and a standard deviation of 0.075. The precision, recall, and F! scores were also all
100%. This once again validated the most important features and resulted in a strong RF
predictor. Attempting to reduce the number of features to less than the three listed above,
resulted in lower precision, recall, and F! scores.
Rachio RF Training
The final device was trained in the exact same way as the previous devices; the
RF classifier was used with all 13 features, with training data that included 1,019
connections without a state change and eleven with a state change from the data collected
during phase 2. The 4-fold cross validation resulted in cross validation scores of
98.449%, 99.224%, 99.221%, and 99.221%. The root mean squared errors were all .264.
The mean was 0.264 with a standard deviation of .0003. The precision, recall, and F!
scores were also all 100%. An RF grid search produced the results in Table 16 and Figure
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9 below. This indicated that the most important feature is orig_pkts, followed by
resp_ip_bytes and orig_ip_bytes.
Table 16
RF feature importance scores for Rachio
Feature
Orig pkts
Resp IP bytes
Orig IP bytes
Resp pkts
Orig bytes

Value
0.15045
0.12303946
0.11599227
0.09410367
0.06746237

RF feature
importance scores
for Rachio
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Figure 9. Feature importance scores for Rachio traffic determined by the Random Forest
classifier
The three most important features F = {orig_pkts, resp_ip_bytes, orig_ip_bytes}
were used to train the RF classifier resulting in cross value scores of 98.44961%,
99.225%, 99.222% and 99.222%. Root mean square errors of .374, .323, .265, and .265, a
mean of 0.307, and a standard deviation of 0.046. The precision, recall, and F! scores
were also all 100%. This validated the most important features and resulted in a strong
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RF predictor. Once again, attempting to reduce the number of features to less than the
three listed above, resulted in lower precision, recall, and F! scores.
Combination of all the Devices’ Traffic
The culminating effort is to identify any state change, regardless of what device it
was produced for, across all three types of smart home devices. All of the files from all of
the device trainings listed above were combined. All of the state changes were labeled
with a one. This resulted in a test set consisting of 3,128 connections without a state
change and 51 with a state change. Once again, the same process was followed for
training the classifiers on the state changes for each smart home device; the 4-fold cross
validation was run to calculate the cross-validation scores, root mean squared errors and
mean. Again, a confusion matrix was calculated, plus the precision, recall and F! score.
This time three different classifiers, Random Forest, Naïve Bayes, and K-Nearest
Neighbors, were used across multiple combinations of features to identify which subset S
(S ⊆ C) when trained with R performs the best.
Random Forest on the Combination of all the Devices’ Traffic
The 4-fold cross validation using RF resulted in cross validation scores of
98.365%, 98.365%, 99.119%, and 99.244%. The root mean squared errors were .128,
.1279, .094, and .094. The mean was .11087019 with a standard deviation of .0170055.
3128 0
d, resulting in a precision score
The confusion matrix was also about the same `
20
31
of 99.682%, recall score of 80.392%, and F! score of 87.645%. The next goal was to
drastically improve these scores. To do so, the RF feature importance scores were used to
choose which features to include in the next training round (see Table 17 below). The
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features all had about the same importance rating, with the majority of features’
importance ranging between 7-9%.
Table 17
RF feature importance scores for all of the devices combined
Feature
Resp bytes
Orig IP bytes
Resp IP bytes
Orig bytes
Orig port
13.83.240.23
Resp pkts
Orig pkts

Value
0.09419
0.0800405
0.07896994
0.0725435
0.07226243
0.07168504
0.04634177
0.04617784

The top three features were chosen to rerun through the system (resp_bytes,
orig_ip_bytes, and resp_ip_bytes). This resulted in cross value scores were 98.36478%,
98.365%, 99.748%, and 99.496%. Root mean square errors of .128, .128, .050, and .071,
a mean of .094, and a standard deviation of 0.034. The precision score was 99.651%,
recall was 78.431%, and F! score of 86.07%. This was not much of an improvement.
In an attempt to improve the training of the system, a fourth feature was added,
orig_bytes. This slightly improved most of the scores, but more importantly, had big
effects on recall and on the F! score. The recall score improved from 78.431% to
87.254% and the F! score went from 86.07% to 92.59%. Both of these are very
encouraging improvements.
To see if these scores could be improved any further, the fifth feature, id.orig_p,
was added. This resulted in almost perfect cross value scores of 99.057%, 99.214%,
99.843%, and 99.213%. Root mean square errors of .089, 0.089, 0.039, and 0.069, a
mean of .071, and a standard deviation of 0.020. The most encouraging results were the
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precision, recall and F! score. The precision was 99.900%, which is hard to improve. The
recall was 93.902 % and the F! score was 96.703%. A summary of the features used and
their scores can be found below in Table 18 and Figure 10. These results indicate that it is
possible to identify state changes from disparate types of devices in the encrypted traffic
sent from an iPhone to the smart devices’ Cloud sites. One interesting finding in the
Table 18 below, is that the F! score is lower when all of the features were used to train
the RF algorithm as opposed to when it is trained with a select subset of features. The
reason for this could be that some of the features are misleading in terms of identifying
state change patterns. When those misleading features were removed, then the F! score
improved.
Table 18
Features used for RF training and their resulting scores
Features
Precision
Recall

𝐅𝟏

id.orig_p, id.resp_h, orig_bytes,
resp_bytes, orig_ip_bytes,
resp_ip_bytes
resp_bytes, orig_ip_bytes, resp_ip

0.99524941

0.70731707

0.7907168
1

0.99650794

0.78431373

All features

0.99698125

0.81372549

All features except duration,
conn_state, history, resp_pkts
orig_bytes, resp_bytes,
orig_ip_bytes, resp_ip_bytes
id.orig_p, orig_bytes, resp_bytes,
orig_ip_bytes, resp_ip_bytes

0.9139747

0.92993393

0.9979306

0.87254902

0.99840663

0.90196078

0.8607478
5
0.8840282
2
0.9217977
4
0.9259294
4
0.9448542
2
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Random Forest On Combined Device
Traffic
id.orig_p, orig_bytes, resp_bytes, orig_ip_bytes,
resp_ip_bytes
orig_bytes, resp_bytes, orig_ip_bytes,
resp_ip_bytes
All features except duration, conn_state, history,
resp_pkts
All features
resp_bytes, orig_ip_bytes, resp_ip
id.orig_p, id.resp_h, orig_bytes, resp_bytes,
orig_ip_bytes, resp_ip_bytes
0
f1_score

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

recall_score

1

precision_score

Figure 10. The Random Forest classifier trained on all device network traffic
Naïve Bayes
The same exact training as discussed above was repeated, but this time with the
Naïve Bayes classifier (NB), which uses conditional probability to assign the most likely
class to an observation (James et al., 2013). To start the training, all of the features were
used. This resulted in a very high F! score of .942. To see if it was possible to improve
the scores and to reduce the number of features, several iterations of removing different
features was performed (see Table 19 and Figure 11 below). The end result was that the
F! score of .942 could not be beat. However, it was possible to achieve the same scores
by removing three of the features leaving the following ten features: id.orig_p, id.resp_h,
id.resp_p, proto, orig_bytes, resp_bytes, conn_state, history, orig_pkts, ip_bytes.
Table 19
Features used for Naïve Bayes training and their resulting scores
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Features

1

All

2

4

All except duration, conn_state,
history, resp_pkts
All except duration, conn_state,
history
All except resp_pkts

5

All except duration, resp_pkts

6

All except duration, resp_pkts,
0.8984375 0.99792199 0.94243709
resp_ip_bytes
All except duration, resp_conn_state, 0.84459459 0.99632353 0.90615498
history, resp_pkts, resp_ip_bytes
id.orig_p, orig_bytes, resp_bytes,
0.50890693 0.60411338 0.2182256
orig_ip_bytes, resp_ip_bytes

3

7
8

Precision

Recall

𝐅𝟏

Set

0.8984375 0.99792199 0.94243709
0.84459459 0.99632353 0.90615498
0.84459459 0.99632353 0.90615498
0.8984375 0.99792199 0.94243709
0.8984375 0.99792199 0.94243709

Naïve Bayes On Combined Device
Traffic
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Set 1

Set 2

Set 3

Set 4

Precision

recall

Set 5

Set 6

Set 7

Set 8

f1_score

Figure 11. The Naïve Bayes classifier trained on all device network traffic
K-Nearest Neighbors
The final classifier to train with was k-nearest neighbors (KNN). KNN uses the
majority class of the K nearest observations to classify new observations (James et al.,
2013). To optimize performance, we set the leaf size to 30 and the number of neighbors
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to five. A small leaf size slows query times, while a larger leaf size turns the algorithm
into a brute force attempt. For this research several leaf sizes and neighbor combinations
were tested, with 30 providing the optimal result. Once again, to begin the training, all
features were used in the exact same manner as outlined in the Random Forest and Naïve
Bayes training sections. The results of all the features was a promising F! score of .903.
In an attempt to improve this score and reduce the number of features used, features were
added and removed over several training iterations (see Table 20 and Figure 12 below).
The winning combination was the use of nine features: id.orig_p, id.resp_h, id.resp_p,
proto, orig_bytes, resp_bytes, orig_pkts, orig_ip_bytes, resp_ip_bytes (all except
duration, conn_state, history, resp_pkts). This produced a much improved F! score of
.944.
Table 20
Features used for K-Nearest Neighbors training and their resulting scores
Set
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Features
All except duration, conn_state,
history, resp_pkts
All except resp_pkts, duration
All except duration, history,
resp_pkts
All except resp_pkts, duration,
resp_ip_bytes
All except resp_pkts
All
orig_bytes, resp_bytes,
orig_ip_bytes, resp_ip_bytes
id.orig_p, orig_bytes
id.orig_p, orig_bytes,
resp_bytes, orig_ip_bytes,
resp_ip_bytes
id.orig_p, orig_ip_byes,
resp_ip_bytes

Precision
Recall
𝐅𝟏
0.95721548 0.93073316 0.94356571
0.91900245 0.95934569
0.91900245 0.95934569

0.9382125
0.9382125

0.89887964 0.92961424

0.9136548

0.9167699 0.90068201 0.90856184
0.91491004 0.89087809 0.90252259
0.90217997 0.8711104 0.88599791
0.87112676 0.89972293 0.88487307
0.87112676 0.89972293 0.88487307
0.89375732 0.87095055 0.88200103
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11

id.orig_p, orig_pkts, resp_pkts,
resp_ip_bytes

0.82861226 0.81968728 0.81961994

K-Nearest Neighbors On Combined Device
Traffic
1
0.95
0.9
0.85
0.8
0.75
0.7
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Set 5 Set 6 Set 7 Set 8 Set 9 Set 10 Set 11
Precision

Recall

F1

Figure 12. The Naïve Bayes classifier trained on all device network traffic
Best Classifier and Features
Overall, all three classifiers, K-Nearest Neighbors, Naïve Bayes, and Random
Forest performed almost equally well with F! scores of .944, .942, and .945 respectively
(see Table 21, Figure 13, and Figure 14 below). The main difference was the precision
versus recall scores, plus the number of classifiers required to train the classifiers. The
most balanced scores were achieved by K-Nearest Neighbors with a precision score of
.957 and a recall score of .931. If it is important to have very few false positives then the
Random Forest classifier, with a precision of .998, would be the best choice. However,
this would result in failing to identify about 10% of the state changes since the recall for
Random Forest is .902. Alternatively, if the goal is to identify almost all of the state
changes, then Naïve Bayes is the best classifier to choose since it had a recall score of
.998. This again comes with a downside: Naïve Bayes had a precision score of .898,
meaning that about 10% of its predictions would be false positives.
Table 21
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Scores comparisons of all three classifiers
Classifier
Precision
Recall
KNN
0.95721548
0.93073316
Naïve Bayes
0.8984375
0.99792199
Random Forest
0.99840663
0.90196078

𝐅𝟏
0.94356571
0.94243709
0.94485422

Performance Scores by Metric Per
Classifier
1.02
1
0.98
0.96
0.94
0.92
0.9
0.88
0.86
0.84
Precision
kNN

Recall
Naïve Bayes

F1 Score
Random Forest

Figure 13. Precision, recall, and F! scores for each of the three classifiers

Performance Scores By Classifier Per
Metric
1.02
1
0.98
0.96
0.94
0.92
0.9
0.88
0.86
0.84
kNN

Naïve Bayes
Precision

Recall

Random Forest

F1 Score

Figure 14. Each classifier and their correspond precision, recall, and F! scores
Random Forest was by far the best classifier in terms of requiring the fewest
number of features to optimally train the classifier, requiring just five features (see Table
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22 below). Both K-Nearest Neighbors and Naïve Bayes required almost twice as many,
needing nine and ten features respectively. Requiring fewer features lowers the overhead
in future training and can simplify the implementation of the classifier.
Table 22
Number of features by category required per classifier
Classifier
Synthesized Protocol
Aggregated Total # of
specific
Features
Random Forest
0
3
2
K-Nearest
0
6
3
Neighbor
Naïve Bayes
2
6
2

5
9
10

All three categories of features, synthesized, protocol specific, and aggregated,
were used to optimally train the classifiers (see Table 22, above). However, synthesized
features were only used by Naïve Bayes. The most heavily relied upon category of
features for training was protocol specific, accounting for 15 out of the total of 24
features used.
Four features were required to optimally train all three of the classifiers: id.orig_p,
orig_bytes, resp_bytes, and orig_ip_bytes (see Table 23, Figure 15, and Figure 16
below). All of these features, except for id.orig_p, deal with the number of bytes sent in
the connection. This indicates that the number of bytes sent is vital information for all
three classifiers when identifying state changes.
Table 23
Features by category required per classifier
Feature Category
Random Forest
K-Nearest Neighbor
Protocol specific
id.orig_p
id.orig_p
Protocol specific
id.resp_h
Protocol specific
id.resp_p
Protocol specific
proto

Naïve Bayes
id.orig_p
id.resp_h
id.resp_p
proto
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Protocol specific
Protocol specific
Synthesized
Synthesized
Aggregated
Aggregated
Aggregated

orig_bytes
resp_bytes

orig_bytes
resp_bytes

orig_ip_bytes
resp_ip_bytes

orig_pkts
orig_ip_bytes
resp_ip_bytes

orig_bytes
resp_bytes
conn_state
history
orig_pkts
orig_ip_bytes

Number Of Features Used By Feature Category
Per Classifier
7
6
5
4
3

6

2
1
0

0

3
2
0

6

Synthesized

Protocol specific

Random Forest

3
2

K-Nearest Neighbor

2

Aggregated
Naïve Bayes

Figure 15. The number of features used in each category for each of the optimally trained
classifiers

Number of Features Used Per Classifier
Classifier By Feature Category
7
6
5
4
3

6

2
1
0

3
0

2
Random Forest
Synthesized

6
3

0
K-Nearest Neighbor
Protocol specific

2

2

Naïve Bayes
Aggregated
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Figure 16. The number of features used by each of the optimally trained classifiers per
feature category
One important aspect to note is overhead issues. When training all three of the
different machine learning algorithms, all three completed their runs within just a few
seconds. Given that the dataset only contained hundreds of lines of data, as opposed to
thousands of lines, a quick run was not surprising. Therefore, it was not possible to judge
which algorithm could require more overhead due to a longer runtime.
Summary
It is possible to identify state changes in encrypted traffic sent from an iPhone to a
smart device’s Cloud site. Training a classifier to spot these change requests is highly
successful when done per device. In other words, near perfect identification of turning a
light switch from on to off from a mobile app can be achieved by identifying patterns in
the encrypted traffic.
It is also possible to train a classifier to identify all state changes hidden in
encrypted network traffic across several types of smart home devices. Three different
classifiers were tested: Random Forest, Naïve Bayes, and K-Nearest Neighbors. All three
had similar success varying only in their recall and precision scores. In this research
experiment, there was success in identifying state changes sent from three different
categories of smart home devices: those that have simple state changes, those that have
more complex state changes, and those that send a lot of data when a state change is
made. The simple devices included the TP-Link WiFi plug and the Chamberlain myQ
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Garage Opener. The more complex device was the Rachio Smart Sprinkler system. The
device that sent a lot of traffic was Amazon’s Ring camera.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary

Conclusions
Smart home device account takeover is trivial due to two of the top vulnerabilities
of smart home devices: weak password policies and a lack of account lockout by the
device’s Cloud server (Alharbi & Aspinall, 2018). Once an attacker has commandeered
access to a smart home device, they could harass the resident, lock the user out of their
device, scare the user out of their house (to gain access to rob it), and several other
malicious attacks (Freed et al., 2018a; Ronen & Shamir, 2016a). Currently, there is not an
easy way for home users to detect that a malicious actor is making unwanted changes to
their smart home devices (Geeng & Roesner, 2019a; Matthews et al., 2017; Zeng et al.,
2017). Previous research has leveraged patterns discovered in encrypted network traffic
to identify a smart home device and if it has received a state change request (Acar et al.,
2018; Apthorpe, Reisman, & Feamster, 2017a; Copos et al., 2016a; Marchal et al., 2019;
Meidan et al., 2017; Miettinen et al., 2017a; V. Sivaraman et al., 2015). The research
detailed in this paper successfully extended previous research by identifying state
changes sent via network traffic between a smart device’s app running on a smartphone
and the smart device’s Cloud site.
This research also succeeded in identifying state change requests sent from a
smartphone to smart home devices’ Cloud sites, across a variety of different types of
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popular smart home devices: 1) devices with simple behaviors, 2) devices with complex
behaviors, and 3) devices that send a lot of data. This included four smart home devices:
the TP-Link smart plug and the myQ garage door opener representing device’s with
simple behaviors, the Rachio smart sprinkler system, which is a device capable of more
complex behaviors, and Amazon’s Ring video camera which sends a large amount of
data. The network traffic patterns indicative of a state change were identified for each of
the smart home devices and then used to label the captured network traffic. The Random
Forest algorithm was successfully trained using this labeled network traffic data for all
four of the devices individually.
The main goal of this research was also achieved. This entailed identifying the
best combination of network traffic features and machine learning algorithms capable of
identifying state changes in encrypted traffic across all four of the devices. The most
balanced results was achieved with the k-Nearest Neighbors algorithm, the Random
Forest algorithm had the highest precision score, and Naïve Bayes had the best recall
score. The most efficient algorithm was determined to be Random Forest and the most
important features were id.orig_p, orig_bytes, resp_bytes, and orig_ip_bytes since they
were used to optimally train each of the three algorithms.
Implications
The purpose of this research was to identify rogue changes made to a smart home
device by an actor who is outside the home network. This addresses the situation when a
user is at home and does not want state changes to be made to their same home devices
by an individual outside the home. Identifying these rogue changes is possible due to the
commonly designed infrastructure of smart home devices; most smart home devices are
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directly controlled by the smart home device’s Cloud server (Apthorpe, Reisman, &
Feamster, 2017a). Therefore, the Cloud server is usually the middleman between the
smart device’s app running on a smartphone and the smart home device. When a user
requests a change on their smartphone via the smart device’s app, the change request is
sent to the smart device’s Cloud server, the change is noted on the Cloud server, and then
sent to the smart home device.
When a user initiates a state change request at home, the change request originates
from inside the home across the home WiFi network, travels outside the home to the
Cloud server, then back in again. This is in contrast to when someone outside the home
makes a change; the change is applied to the Cloud server, sent down to the home WiFi
network, and applied to the smart device. What is missing when the change request
originates from outside the home is the traversal of the state change request across the
home WiFi network. This missing piece can be used to establish if the change originated
from inside the home or from outside the home; if the state change is seen in the home
WiFi traffic, then it originated from inside the home, if it is not seen, then the change
originated from outside the home.
This research, using machine learning algorithms, successfully identified state
change requests sent from a smartphone, across the home WiFi network, to the smart
device’s Cloud site. This was accomplished for three main types of smart home devices:
those are capable of simple behaviors, those with more complex behaviors, and those that
send a lot of data.
A limitation of this research was that the Zeek was the main tool used to analyze
network traffic. There are several other means to explore network traffic which should be
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explored in future research. Additionally, most of the identification tasks included in this
research are binary. The implication is that if multiple categories are added, then the
performance will more than likely degrade.
Recommendations
This research extends previous work which explored the use of machine learning
to identify state changes applied to smart home devices. This research can also be
extended. Network traffic generated from other smart home device apps can be added to
the traffic generated and labeled from this research. This would create a list of devices
that could or could not have their state changes identified in encrypted traffic by machine
learning algorithms. Further testing could be done by adding more smart home devices to
each category of smart home devices and then testing the effectiveness of machine
learning within each category or combinations between categories.
Additionally, smart hubs and smart assistants could also be studied. As stated
previously, both devices act similarly to smart phones in that they send state changes via
encrypted traffic over a home WiFi network. Therefore, it is possible that using a similar
approach taken in this research, state changes sent by smart hubs and smart assistants
could be identified.
This research project used 13 different network traffic features, in various
combinations to train machine learning algorithms. This omitted eight features that were
identified by this research as potential candidates. These could be tested along with others
that this research did not identify. It is possible that the features that were not tested prove
easier to derive or may even improve the training.
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This research did not cover an exhaustive combination of features tested with
machine learning algorithms. Many more could be tested. Additionally, new features
could be combined with new machine learning algorithms that were not identified in this
research. Combinations of these could also be included in future research.
Once again, the purpose of this research was to identify and possibly prevent
unwanted external state changes. Therefore, future research could build such a system
that would be capable of doing just that: either alerting the home user of a rogue change
or blocking the change from being applied to the smart home device. This would involve
tying together this research with previous research that demonstrated the feasibility of
identifying state changes sent from the Cloud site to the smart home device. The missing
piece of the proposed system would need to be capable of linking state changes sent out
to the Cloud site via a smartphone on the home WiFi network to those that were coming
in from the Cloud site to the smart home device. Preventing the state change from taking
place has previously been studied in the form of intrusion prevention systems that are
capable of dropping unwanted packets.
Summary
Smart home devices are becoming more popular with consumers with the number
of devices in peoples’ homes increasing (He et al., 2018). Malicious users have taken
notice of this trend and have begun to manipulate these devices through known
vulnerabilities such as poor authentication practices (Freed et al., 2018a). One way to
monitor these malicious changes is by monitoring home network traffic.
Change requests to smart home devices travel across the network in the form of
encrypted network packets. Since the traffic is typically encrypted, it is not possible to
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simply read the contents of the packet to learn if the packet contains instructions for the
smart device to change states (Apthorpe, Reisman, Sundaresan, et al., 2017; Copos et al.,
2016a). However, there are attributes of the packet that are not that are not encrypted,
which, along with the size of the payload can be used to establish patterns indicative of a
smart device state change request, versus an update, versus a status check (Meidan et al.,
2017). This research has extended previous research by identifying the best combination
of features and machine learning algorithms combination capable of identifying state
change requests across a variety of different types of popular smart home devices. This
was accomplished in three major phases: phase 1) focused on analyzing the publicly
available network data captures, phase 2) involved capturing the network traffic and
identifying the traffic patterns indicative of a state change request of several smart home
devices, and phase 3) included identifying network traffic features, using those features to
train machine learning algorithms, and identify the machine learning algorithm that
performed the best across all of the selected smart home devices.
Phase one involved the datasets provided by Alrawi et al. (2019) and Ren et al.
(2019). Alrawi et al. (2019) collected network traffic over a period of 13 days resulting in
over 150 GB of data. The analysis of this dataset found that there was not one instance
when both the smart device’s app and the smart device were sending or receiving
network traffic within the same timeframe (i.e. within five minutes of each other). The
second dataset from Ren et al. (2019), included network traffic captured from 81 different
smart home devices located in labs located in the United States and the United Kingdom.
In-depth analysis of both datasets was performed. Unfortunately, it was discovered that
the network traffic did not contain any network traffic from a smartphone or tablet.
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Phase two involved capturing network traffic in a lab environment and then
identifying the state changes of four smart home devices from three different categories
of devices: 1) simple behavior, where the TP-Link WiFi Plug and the Chamberlain myQ
Garage Opener were selected, 2) complex behavior, which included the Rachio Smart
Sprinkler, and 3) sending large amounts of data, in which the Amazon’s Ring video
camera was selected. The TP-Link’s state change was identified by a new connection that
would be created between the iPhone and the TP-Link WiFi Plug directly whenever the
switch was turned on or off. Additionally, identical values for three network attributes
were seen every time the plug’s state was changed. For the myQ device, a pattern
emerged in which the app on the iPhone would communicate with the account-devicesgdo.myq-cloud.com Cloud site whenever the door was either opened or closed. Next, the
Ring device’s state change was identified by SIP traffic that was seen every time the
camera was put into Live mode. Finally, the Rachio “quick run” state change was
identified by the connection to the Cloud site rach.io.
The training of the machine learning algorithms involved selected features from
three categories: 1) aggregated, 2) synthesized, and 3) protocol specific. This included 13
features across the three categories. The first step involved using the Random Forest
algorithm to identify state changes of each of the devices. The TP-Link plug was
successfully trained with the just three features: resp_bytes, original_bytes, and
orig_ip_bytes. Perfect scores for cross validation across all folds was achieved, with
perfect scores for the root mean square score across all folds, and for the precision, recall,
and F! scores. Only three features was necessary to optimally train the myQ device:
id.resp_h,orig_ip_bytes, and duration. The precision, recall, and F! scores were all 100%.
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Again, only three features were needed to successfully train the Ring device: id.resp_p,
orig_ip_bytes, and resp_ip_bytes. The precision, recall, and F! scores were all 100%.
Finally, the Rachio device also required three features to optimally train it: orig_pkts,
resp_ip_bytes, and orig_ip_bytes. The precision, recall, and F! scores were, once again,
all 100%.
The culminating task was to combine all of the network traffic from all four of the
devices and then train three different machine learning algorithms with different
combinations of features. The three different algorithms were Random Forest, Naïve
Bayes, and K-Nearest Neighbors. Starting with the Random Forest algorithm, the best
results were obtained with five features: resp_bytes, orig_ip_bytes, resp_ip_bytes,
orig_bytes, and id.orig_p. This produced a precision score of 99.9002%, recall of 93.902
%, and an F! score of 96.7033%. The Naïve Bayes algorithm performed similarity, with a
precision score of 99.9002%, recall of 93.902 % and an F! score of 96.7033%. Finally
the K-Nearest Neighbors algorithm produced the best results when trained with ten
features: id.orig_p, id.resp_h, id.resp_p, proto, orig_bytes, resp_bytes, orig_pkts,
ip_bytes, resp_ip_bytes (all except duration, conn_state, history, resp_pkts). This
produced an impressive F! score of .9435.
Overall, all three classifiers, K-Nearest Neighbors, Naïve Bayes, and Random
Forest performed almost equally well with F! scores of .94356, .9423, and .9449
respectively. They varied in their precision and recall scores, plus the number of
classifiers required for training. K-Nearest Neighbors achieved the most balanced results
with a precision score of .9572 and a recall score of .9307. The Random Forest algorithm
had the highest precision score of .9984 and Naïve Bayes had the best recall score of
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.9979. In terms of number of features required to train an algorithm, Random Forest was
by far the best requiring just five features. Finally, it was evident that the most important
features, which were used for all three classifiers, came down to just four features:
id.orig_p, orig_bytes, resp_bytes, and orig_ip_bytes.
In summary, our research goal – the identification of state changes by using
encrypted IoT network traffic – was achieved empirically. The success of identifying
state change requests sent from a mobile app, combined with previous research that
identified state changes sent to the smart home device, allows for the development of a
system that could block unwanted state changes that originate from a malicious user
located outside of the house. Therefore, this research adds to the body of knowledge to
IoT security and could be extended to the identification of other networking patterns
based on encrypted traffic.

98

Appendix A
Zeek Information
Zeek’s conn.log fields
Field

Description

ts

This is the time of the first packet.

uid

A unique identifier of the connection.

id.orig_h

The originator's 4-tuple of endpoint address.

id.orig_p

The originator's 4-tuple of endpoint port.

id.resp_h

The responder's 4-tuple of endpoint address.

id.resp_p

The responder's 4-tuple of endpoint port.

proto

The transport layer protocol of the connection.

service
duration

An identification of an application protocol being sent over the connection.
How long the connection lasted. For 3-way or 4-way connection tear-downs, this will
not include the final ACK.

orig_bytes

The number of payload bytes the originator sent.

resp_bytes

The number of payload bytes the responder sent. See orig_bytes.

conn_state

missed_bytes

There are several possible conn_state values (see table below).
If the connection is originated locally, this value will be T. If it was originated
remotely it will be F.
If the connection is responded to locally, this value will be T. If it was responded to
remotely it will be F.
Indicates the number of bytes missed in content gaps, which is representative of packet
loss.

history

Records the state history of connections as a string of letters (see table below).

local_orig
local_resp

orig_pkts

Number of packets that the originator sent
Number of IP level bytes that the originator sent (as seen on the wire, taken from the IP
orig_ip_bytes total_length header field).
resp_pkts

Number of packets that the responder sent.
Number of IP level bytes that the responder sent (as seen on the wire, taken from the IP
resp_ip_bytes total_length header field).
conn_state
value
conn_state value descriptions
Zeek’s possible conn_state values
Value

Description

S0

Connection attempt seen, no reply.
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S1

Connection established, not terminated.

SF

Normal establishment and termination.

REJ

Connection attempt rejected.

S2

Connection established and close attempt by originator seen (but no reply from responder).

S3

Connection established and close attempt by responder seen (but no reply from originator).

RSTO

Connection established, originator aborted (sent a RST).

RSTR

Responder sent a RST.

RSTOS0

SH

Originator sent a SYN followed by a RST, we never saw a SYN-ACK from the responder.
Responder sent a SYN ACK followed by a RST, we never saw a SYN from the (purported)
originator.
Originator sent a SYN followed by a FIN, we never saw a SYN ACK from the responder
(hence the connection was “half” open).

SHR

Responder sent a SYN ACK followed by a FIN, we never saw a SYN from the originator.

OTH

No SYN seen, just midstream traffic (a “partial connection” that was not later closed).

RSTRH

Zeek’s conn.log history field
Letter

Meaning

s

a SYN w/o the ACK bit set

h

a SYN+ACK (“handshake”)

a

a pure ACK

d

packet with payload (“data”)

f

packet with FIN bit set

r

packet with RST bit set

c

packet with a bad checksum (applies to UDP too)

g

a content gap

t

packet with retransmitted payload

w

packet with a zero window advertisement

i

inconsistent packet (e.g. FIN+RST bits set)

q

multi-flag packet (SYN+FIN or SYN+RST bits set)
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Letter
^

Meaning
connection direction was flipped by Zeek’s heuristic

Note: If the event comes from the originator, the letter is in upper-case
Connections involving state changes sent from the iPhone to the myQ Cloud site
id.ori
g_h
192.1
68.8.
248
192.1
68.8.
248
192.1
68.8.
248
192.1
68.8.
248
192.1
68.8.
248
192.1
68.8.
248

id.o
rig
_p
554
17
554
34
554
46
554
23
554
35
554
47

id.re
sp_h
13.8
3.24
0.23
13.8
3.24
0.23
13.8
3.24
0.23
13.8
3.24
0.23
13.8
3.24
0.23
13.8
3.24
0.23

id.r
esp
_p
443

p
ro
to
tc
p

se
rv
ice
ssl

443

tc
p

ssl

443

tc
p

ssl

443

tc
p

ssl

443

tc
p

ssl

443

tc
p

ssl

du
rat
ion
0.3
476
65
0.3
241
97
0.4
003
31
1.0
862
21
0.4
760
44
0.3
590
15

orig
_by
tes
112
1

resp
_by
tes
574
6

con
n_st
ate
S1

124
8

574
6

S1

124
8

574
6

S1

117
4

434

S1

124
9

574
6

S1

124
9

574
6

S1

hist
ory
ShA
DTa
dt
ShA
DTa
dt
ShA
DTa
dt
ShA
DTa
dt
ShA
DTa
dt
ShA
DTa
dt

ori
g_p
kts
24

orig_
ip_b
ytes
3490

res
p_p
kts
24

resp_
ip_by
tes
1273
2

24

3744

24

1273
2

22

3640

24

1273
2

20

4422

20

1900

24

3746

24

1273
2

24

3746

24

1273
2
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